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INTRODUCTION
In surveying the landscape of American real estate, it is
increasingly difficult—if not impossible—to find a development or
community that is not part of or subject to a larger, comprehensive, and
common-interest plan.1 Whether one is strolling through the avenues of
a mixed-use development after finishing dinner and a long day of
shopping or driving down the manicured, tree-lined streets past rows of
uniform, wrought-iron mailboxes in a residential neighborhood, careful
planning and coordination went into making these developments
possible.2 And this careful planning and coordination were not merely
the result of one-time efforts; rather, a complex and detailed legal
regime underpins the entire development to ensure that the order,
quality, and aesthetic of the project continue into the future.3
These types of developments, which have come to dominate nearly
all real estate development in the United States, are known as
“common interest communities.”4 The idea behind the common
interest community concept is to create developments whereby the
1. See Patrick K. Hetrick, Drafting Common Interest Community Documents:
Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 409 (2008);
Harvey Rishikof & Alexander Wohl, Private Communities or Public Governments:
“The State Will Make the Call”, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 509, 521 (1996); David J.
Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the Impact of Gated
Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 763 (1995).
2. See Katharine Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State
Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 20 (1984); James W. Torke, What Price Belonging: An Essay
on Groups, Community, and the Constitution, 24 IND. L. REV. 1 (1990); ROBERT JAY
DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 62 (1992).
3. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE
RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 140 (1994); Gregory S. Alexander,
Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 23 (1989); Frank Michelman, Universal Resident Suffrage: A
Liberal Defense, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1581 (1982).
4. See Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest Communities: Evolution and
Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303, 305 (1998).
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owners or occupants share common responsibilities with regard to the
upkeep, maintenance, and expenses of the development as a whole.5
Moreover, these developments are typically structured so as to ensure
that a certain level of beauty, quality, and visual appeal is maintained
even after the developer no longer owns any part of the community.6
Governance of the community is assumed by an association, the board
of which is made up of the elected owners of the lots or units within
the development.7 And, with the ability to charge each owner an annual
assessment, the association is able to maintain funds for the repair,
replacement, and enhancement of the community over time.8 The
common interest community framework is seen in almost all forms of
property-related projects, including condominium complexes, housing
developments, vacation timeshares, and many mixed-use projects.9
Through this framework, the various owners/occupants of the
development can enjoy amenities—such as a community park, tennis
court, or swimming pool—that would otherwise be too expensive for
any individual owner/occupant to afford on his or her own.10
The first common interest communities came into existence around
the period from 1910 to 1935 in the form of simple homeowners’

5. See Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of
Community Associations: In Search of the Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 589, 698 (1993); Shirley L. Mays, Privatization of Municipal
Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41, 57 (1995).
6. See Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass’n, 779 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App.
1989) (holding in favor of a restrictive covenant because the court thought that “the
public policy the Uniform Condominium Act [is] in favor of the social benefits of
planned community developments”); Justin D. Cummins, Recasting Fair Share:
Toward Effective Housing Law and Principled Social Policy, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 339,
347–48 (1996) (showing that community associations can stabilize and mobilize
social resources for advancement, but people in low-income, central-city
communities are socially isolated from the community association); William C.
Jensen & Cynthia L. McNeill, Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act—How It Is
Doing, 25 COLO. LAW. 17, 17–18 (1996) (showing that the unit owner’s association is
responsible for the “social cohesiveness of its owners”).
7. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.16 (2000); see also
Susan F. French, Making Common Interest Communities Work: The Next Step, 37
URB. LAW. 359, 362 (2005).
8. See Paula Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest
Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice”, 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005).
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6, introductory cmt.
(2000); see also Hyatt, supra note 4.
10. See Todd Brower, Communities Within the Community: Consent,
Constitutionalism, and Other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential Associations, 7
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 204 (1992); Government by the Nice, for the Nice,
ECONOMIST, July 25, 1992, at 25; see also SETHA LOW, BEHIND THE GATES: LIFE,
SECURITY, AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS IN FORTRESS AMERICA 153–73 (2003).
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associations.11 In these early common interest communities, the
various owners within a development, desiring to obtain large-scale
common amenities, pooled together resources to erect and maintain
these desired facilities and services.12 Since then, the complexity of
common interest communities has grown tremendously, particularly
through the increasing emergence of mixed-use developments.13
Moreover, the associations that govern and maintain common interest
communities have become involved in spheres beyond the mere
physical or traditional boundaries of the development as they seek
more and more to influence political decision-making at the local level,
coordinate social activities for development occupants, and even
undertake the privatization of certain public or municipal services.14
For example, the Reston Town Center common interest community
in Virginia is composed of three separate sub-common interest
communities: one for each of the industrial, business, and residential
portions of the development.15 The business and the industrial centers
are governed by their own non-profit associations, while the
association that governs the residential portion is further divided into
more sub-associations that cover cluster areas within the larger
residential area.16 In order to coordinate all of these various
developments, functions, and expenses, a joint association committee
was established to manage the entire Reston Town Center community.17
This overseeing association manages everything from the
development’s coordinated transportation system to events and
programs that support the arts and cultural aspects of the community.18
In essence, common interest communities have become major
undertakings that take on many of the functions of government and tie

11. See MARC A. WEISS & JOHN W. WATTS, COMMUNITY BUILDERS AND
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: THE ROLE OF REAL ESTATE DEVELOPERS IN PRIVATE
RESIDENTIAL GOVERNANCE, in U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 97–99 (1989), available at http://www
.globalurban.org/Community_Builders_and_Community_Associations.pdf [http:
//perma.cc/4Z6E-N9XT] (archived Mar. 10, 2014).
12. See id.
13. See Hyatt, supra note 4, at 321; Robert G. Natelson, Condominiums, Reform,
and the Unit Ownership Act, 58 MONT. L. REV. 495, 500–01 (1997).
14. See Hyatt, supra note 4; JAMES HOWARD KUNTSLER, HOME FROM
NOWHERE: REMAKING OUR EVERYDAY WORLD FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (1996).
15. See Hyatt, supra note 4, at 321.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 322.
18. Id.
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together the interests of various private parties in order to achieve a
larger, dynamic goal.19
But, as might be imagined, these complex and highly sophisticated
developments do not come for free.20 Real estate lending, which has
for most of its history been tied to more traditional types of residential
or commercial developments, has had to morph and evolve to fit the
needs of the ambitious developers of these complex, common interest
communities.21 On the one hand, these types of developments—
particularly the more complex and multi-tiered ones—carry with them
a great deal of risk because so much capital must be incorporated on
the front end to construct the various common facilities and amenities
that make the development economically viable.22 But on the other
hand, the payoff from the creation of a unique and highly marketable
development that can assure continued quality, aesthetic, and financial
self-sufficiency can be substantial.23
And like all lenders, a primary concern in assessing whether a loan
for a common interest community has merit involves assessing what
type of collateral is available to secure the debt.24 Traditional types of
collateral, such as the real estate underlying the project, the buildings
and improvements to be erected on that land, as well as the equipment,
materials, accounts, and various other assets of the borrower all serve

19. Id. See also Paula A. Franzese, Does It Take a Village? Privatization,
Patterns of Restrictiveness and the Demise of Community, 47 VILL. L. REV. 553
(2002); Paula A. Franzese, Building Community in Common Interest Communities:
The Promise of the Restatement (Third) of Servitudes, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
17, 19 (2003).
20. See generally David L. Callies, Common Interest Communities: An
Introduction, 37 URB. LAW. 325 (2005); Julia Patterson Forrester & Jerome Michael
Organ, Promising to Be Prudent: A Private Law Approach to Mortgage Loan
Regulation in Common interest communities, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 739 (2012).
21. See generally GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FINANCE,
AND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS (8th ed. 2009).
22. See Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage
Foreclosures 2 (N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 08-41, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1270121; G. THOMAS
KINGSLEY ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES
13–21 (2009); FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT,
at xv (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y7GY-CEG7] (archived Mar. 10, 2014); Stewart E. Sterk,
Neponsit Property Owners’ Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank, in
PROPERTY STORIES 301, 308 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
23. See MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 35; NELSON ET AL., supra note 21.
24. See generally Dean P. Wyman, May I Have My Balance Please? Allocation
of Payments in Bankruptcy Cases, 100 COM. L.J. 132 (1995); OLIVER R. SIMS &
FRANKLIN B. FIELDS, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING: RISK MITIGATION AND
BANK SUPERVISION (2013).
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as the backbone to any real estate financing.25 However, common
interest communities provide an additional and very unique type of
asset—the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“the
declaration” or the “CCRs”).26 This document lays out the legal regime
that gives teeth and effects to the common interest community by
ensuring that each owner is responsible for sharing in the costs of the
community and that the quality and visual appeal of the development
can be legally maintained.27 For a significant period during the early
part of the development’s life, it is the developer who exercises the
powers under the declaration and thereby is able to control and govern
the development to ensure his or her vision is upheld.28
Importantly, these declarations serve as an ample form of collateral
to guarantee that the lender, upon foreclosure, is able to continue to
ensure that the asset maintains its quality and value until a third-party
buyer can be procured.29 As such, many lenders have come to require
that the developer grant a security interest in the CCRs to secure the
debt.30 By doing so, the lender obtains a powerful tool that can help
safeguard the property’s value if a default and subsequent foreclosure
occurs.31 However, when developers default on real estate loans, it is
typically preceded by other financial woes and troubles.32 And
specifically, often times when a default occurs, many of the duties that
the developer owed to the owners under the declaration have either
gone unfulfilled or were breached due to lack of diligence or even
malfeasance on the part of the distressed developer.33
For example, Developer A obtains a loan from Realty Bank to
construct a mixed-use development called Bluebell Lane, for which the
bank takes a mortgage on the entire property. A comprehensive and
complex declaration of CCRs is placed on the entire development in
order to ensure that Developer A’s vision of a high-quality,
aesthetically pleasing, and well-organized development—which will
be comprised of offices, retail spaces, restaurants, shopping, and
residential areas—will be created and maintained. In that vein, Realty
Bank obtains a security interest in the CCRs as well.

25. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH (7th ed. 2008); NELSON ET AL., supra note 21.
26. See infra Part I.A–C and accompanying discussion.
27. See infra Part I.A–C.
28. See infra Part I.A–C; see also PATRICK H. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN,
COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 9.01, 9.02 (2001).
29. See infra Part I.A–C.
30. See infra Part I.A–C.
31. See infra Part I.A–C.
32. See Forrester & Organ, supra note 20.
33. See infra Parts III, IV.
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Among other things, the declaration requires Developer A to erect
a community pool and recreation center on the rooftop of the third
floor of one of the buildings in the development. After building most of
Bluebell Lane and selling or leasing out various portions of the
development, it is discovered that the pool is leaking and has caused
damage to the occupants of the lower floors of the building. Further,
this has resulted in the various disgruntled residents having no place to
swim or engage in community recreational activities. Shortly
thereafter, there are accusations that Developer A has not properly
accounted for the assessments paid to him under the declaration by the
various owners. These travails ultimately culminate in the developer’s
default on the loan due to Realty Bank.
After failed negotiations, Realty Bank forecloses on Bluebell Lane
and obtains ownership of the portions of the development that are still
owned by Developer A and subject to the bank’s mortgage at the time
of the default. Also, Realty Bank forecloses on its security rights in the
declaration and thereby steps into the developer’s shoes as the new
declarant. But after the foreclosure, the aggrieved owners are still
seeking recourse for the developer’s failure to construct the required
improvements, as well as the property damage caused by the leaking
pool and for the allegations of mismanagement of the community’s
common funds. All of these alleged breaches were made by the
developer in and during his role as the declarant. Now that Realty Bank
is the declarant, can the owners go against the bank for the developer’s
past misdeeds? If so, is the bank liable for all or only some of these bad
acts? Does the developer remain liable for some portion regardless?
And is there a limit on this successor liability for the bank? The
answers to these questions can produce substantial effects for both the
bank and the developer, as well as for the ability of the owners to
obtain justice.
While many, if not all, of these questions have been addressed in
the laws of most jurisdictions, Louisiana is not one of them.34 How
would a Louisiana court address the successor liability of Realty Bank?
This question, as well as the nuanced issues of how (and if) such
complex animals as common interest community declarations can be
collateralized under Louisiana’s security devices regime, has been
given little to no treatment by commentators or the jurisprudence. To
that end, this Article attempts to shed light on the complexities of
common interest community declarations and the possibilities (as well
as possible limitations) with regard to how they can be collateralized in
Louisiana.35 Part I gives an overview of common interest communities
and the CCR declarations that form such an integral part of their
34. See infra Part III.A–C.
35. See infra Part II.A–C.
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substance, as well as discusses the various privileges, advantages, and
powers that they confer on the developer and, by extension, a
foreclosing lender.36 Part II explores the multifaceted nature of these
types of legal instruments and analyzes how Louisiana’s various
security devices interface with CCR collateral.37 Part III discusses the
potential successor liability of lenders who foreclose on CCR
declarations and considers how Louisiana courts might utilize various
legal theories, doctrines, and related statutes to make the ultimate
determination of successor liability.38 Finally, Part IV critiques the
application of these theories, doctrines, and piecemeal statutory
constructs under existing state law and, in the alternative, advocates for
the legislative adoption of a comprehensive and uniform statutory
framework for all types of common interest communities in Louisiana
that will lay to rest, in a fair and equitable way, the question of
successor liability for lenders turned declarants.39
I. DECLARATIONS AND REAL ESTATE
Because economic forces place great weight on the aesthetics and
atmosphere of a community or project, developers are highly
incentivized to ensure that their developments conform to standards of
beauty, quality, and sophistication.40 These factors are directly
connected to the development’s value, how people view the project,
who chooses to live or work there, and even the level of safety and
security that the area enjoys.41 Because of the intimate connection
between the aesthetic and atmosphere of the place and its economic
viability, developers often impose a comprehensive and complex set of
rules and restrictions on the property to not only ensure that the
development obtains the desired level of quality and beauty, but also
that these conditions continue into the future.
This objective is accomplished chiefly through various legal
institutions contained in a wide-ranging legal document called a
36. See infra Part I.
37. See infra Part II.
38. See infra Part III.
39. See infra Part IV.
40. See Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697
(2010).
41. See JILL GRANT, PLANNING THE GOOD COMMUNITY: NEW URBANISM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 58 (2005); see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 75 (1961); ANDRES DUANY & ELIZABETH PLATERZYBERK, TOWNS AND TOWN-MAKING PRINCIPLES 9–11 (Alex Krieger & William
Lennertz eds., 1991); ANDRES DUANY ET AL., SUBURBAN NATION: THE RISE OF
SPRAWL AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM 80–81 (2000); George L.
Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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“declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions.”42 However,
developers are not the only parties to a real estate development who
recognize the importance of the declaration and its effects. Banks and
other lenders who help make the deal happen also desire to ensure that
the project is well regulated and coordinated.43 Understanding how
these declarations interface with the motivations of the lender are
essential to understanding the long-term financing of many real estate
developments across the country.44
A. Micro-governments
At the heart of every comprehensive property declaration is the
desire to create a community whereby its inhabitants can exercise
control over their given environment.45 Often times these take the form
of homeowners’ associations whereby the individual owners of the
parcels within the subdivision band together to create a form of local
government to regulate and control the goings-on within that particular
community.46 Other times this system of community control takes
place in a large condominium complex where the various owners of
the units pool resources and elect leaders to administer the functions of
government.47 Still others involve a collection of commercial property
owners within a given retail or office development who share in the
responsibility of governing and maintaining their building or
complex.48 The residents or occupants of these developments can range
from as few as ten to much larger developments that can dwarf the size

42. See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 711–13.
43. See generally Daniel E. Feder, Should Loan-to-Value Ratio Restrictions Be
Reimposed on National Banks’ Real Estate Lending Activities?, 6 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 341 (1987); Scott A. Lindquist, Real Estate Lending Regulations: The
New Ball Game, 7 PROB. & PROP. 11 (1993).
44. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 21.
45. See Mark A. Rogers, Community Association Law: Administrative Law as a
Solution by Analogy, 53 EMORY L.J. 1457 (2004).
46. See DILGER, supra note 2, at 5; see also James L. Winokur, Critical
Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1135, 1138 (1998) (“In the largest United States metropolitan areas, a majority
of all new housing sold is now in common interest communities.”); Rebecca J.
Schwartz, Public Gated Residential Communities: The Rosemont, Illinois, Approach
and Its Constitutional Implications, 29 URB. LAW. 123, 124–25 (1997) (“Long
considered the domain of wealthy subdivisions on each coast, demand for gated
communities . . . has increased dramatically since the early 1980s.”).
47. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? 1, 3–4 (1989).
48. See generally id.
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of many small towns and villages.49 And similar to local governments,
they often stretch over a large geographic area.50 Further, these
governing associations not only regulate and control the property
within a given development, but they are also given direct ownership
over certain portions of the development to hold in favor of the
owners—such as a community park or garden space.51
Further, much like municipal governments, associations will often
provide various goods and services to the development such as
ensuring the maintenance of roads and streets, as well as overseeing
regular safety patrols.52 With many residential subdivisions, the
services provided by the association can even include golf courses,
swimming pools, and community centers.53 And to pay for these
government-like functions, the association has a quasi-taxing power,
which allows it to charge assessments against each of the parcels or
units within the development.54 The pooling of these funds creates a
common treasury from which monies can be drawn for both ordinary
and extraordinary maintenance, repair, expenses, and special projects.55
To those owners who refuse to pay, the association can place a
property lien against their parcel and thereby cause issues of nonmerchantable title, violations of existing loan agreements, and a
weakening of the parcel’s commercial viability.56 Moreover, not all
associations are created equal.57 Some provide a higher or lower degree
of quality and variety of services to their owners.58 It is through this
menu of services that various developments obtain their identities.59
49. See Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1375, 1382 (1994).
50. See Paula A. Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review
and Review of Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663 (2000).
51. See Wiseman, supra note 40.
52. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1382.
53. See N. Palm Beach Cnty. Water Control Dist. v. Florida, 604 So. 2d 440, 444
(Fla. 1992) (“The onsite roadway improvements include paving of the roadways, the
striping, the signage, landscaping with the roadways, irrigation to maintain the
landscaping and sodding, bridges, an overpass, culverts, street lighting, security
gatehouses, and secondary drainage system consisting of storm drainage pipes, inlets,
manholes and surface drainage.”).
54. See, e.g., Westwood Homeowners Ass’n v. Lane County, 847 P.2d 862, 865
(Or. Ct. App. 1993); Bd. of Dirs. of Olde Salem Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Sec’y of
Veterans Affairs, 589 N.E.2d 761, 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Inwood North
Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Harris, 736 S.W.2d 632, 636–37 (Tex. 1987); see also
Wiseman, supra note 40.
55. See Rishikof & Wohl, supra note 1, at 518.
56. Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829
(2004).
57. Gillette, supra note 49, at 1388–90.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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“Just as municipalities may distinguish themselves by offering superior
schools, spacious parks, or proximity to workplaces, so may
associations offer singular services such as security gateways, a golf
course, or a ‘Caribbean Island’ motif.”60 For instance, Louisiana’s
more upper-end residential developments typically provide a sort of
French country chateau region-type feel with the maintenance of
artificial lakes, fountains, tree-lined avenues, and brick sidewalks
handled by the association.61
Although the generally understood goal of community associations
is to create and maintain the value of the development,62 various other,
more nuanced purposes for these micro-governments have been
expressed by property law scholars.63 As an initial matter, associations
are formed to provide a certain service or fulfill a certain goal.64 Much
like in the way local governments are valued for providing essential
services to their citizenry, community associations are similarly desired
due to their ability to provide certain services.65 Further, commentators
note that the quality of services provided by a local government
typically are not directly aligned with the geographical boundary of the
municipality.66 Demand may be higher in one portion of the city, yet
the services are diffused equally throughout.67 Nor does the municipal
system of service provide specially allocated services to those who are
most in need of them.68 Associations provide a type of solution to this
60. Id. at 1383.
61. See, e.g., JR Ball, We’re the Face of Poverty: This Is the Tale of Our Two
Baton Rouges, BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Nov. 14, 2011), available at
http://www.businessreport.com/article/20111114/BUSINESSREPORT0202/11111
9897 [http://perma.cc/QPX6-3DPF] (archived Mar. 10, 2014) (“That’s because
readers of this publication tend to be business executives, tend to be in an uppermiddle-income bracket or higher, tend to be white and tend to live in faux French
Country homes, many along Highland Road and almost all well south of Florida
Boulevard.”).
62. See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 699 (“The aesthetics and atmosphere of our
neighborhoods and communities matter. In addition to their ability to raise or lower
property values, they affect the ways we think and interact with each other, how our
children play, how we choose to travel, and even crime rates.”).
63. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1388–1406 (discussing of the public goods
versus the civil community models of associations).
64. Id. at 1388 (“For those who consider a primary value of local governments to
be their capacity to provide local public goods efficiently, the ability of residential
associations to achieve that same objective underlies much of their appeal.”).
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing An Analysis of Authorities: Traditional and Multicounty, 71 MICH. L.
REV. 1376, 1426–27 (1973); ADVISORY COMM’N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
METROPOLITAN ORGANIZATION: THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY CASE 86–88 (1992)).
67. See Gillette, supra note 49, 1387; see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 135–45 (1962).
68. See Gillette, supra note 49, 1389–90 (“Localities are bound by legal
obligations of equal service and “public purpose” spending that are imposed to
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problem of distribution.69 Individuals who desire the same service or
the same level and quality of a certain service can come together, pool
resources, and create a system of private ordering that meets such
specific goals.70 “Individuals who, for instance, desire more police
service than the average resident of the municipality may find it easier
to coalesce in a section of the municipality and hire private security
forces rather than lobby for more police service citywide.”71 By
engaging in this form of micro-governance, the distribution of public
services is more closely aligned with the supply and demand for such
services, as those who most utilize and desire the public goods are
responsible for paying for the cost.72
In that same vein, the rules and restrictions that are imposed by the
association—through the declaration—create a sense of homogeneity
and consistency throughout the development.73 And because of the
intricate steps that are involved in changing the rules and restrictions of
an association—as well as the way in which such covenants run with
the land or units regardless of who is the owner—the CCRs create a
system that prevents radical or sweeping changes in the nature and
aesthetic of the development.74
B. Declarations and Power
Aside from its many effects and purposes, community associations
draw their power and authority from the comprehensive property
declaration.75 These typically rather large documents are comprised of
a complex and detailed framework of servitudes and building

prevent invidious discrimination within the municipality or to preclude discrete
groups from lobbying successfully for unique benefits. As one result of these
doctrines, even where the effects of public provision coincide with local boundaries,
localities cannot readily respond to differential demand by residents. Residents within
the locality who would prefer to trade one service for another are unable to do so.”);
see also HENRY J. RAIMONDO, ECONOMICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 77–
79 (1992).
69. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1390.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1390–91.
72. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 814–23 (1987); see also Todd Sandler
& John T. Tschirhart, The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, 18 J.
ECON. LIT. 1481, 1482 (1980).
73. Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 906,
907–09 (1988).
74. See Gillette, supra note 49, 1395–99.
75. See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION
PRACTICE: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION LAW 24 (3d ed. 2000).
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restrictions that are imposed collectively upon the entirety of the
property within the development (be it all the land in the subdivision or
all of the units and common areas within a condominium complex or
office building/park).76 Because the entire development is initially
owned by the developer, the drafting of the declaration lies with his or
her lawyers.77 The goal is to provide a comprehensive set of rules and
frameworks that will govern the development from its beginning stages
of construction, through its development, during its early years of
operation, and into the future.78 As individual parcels or units are sold
to third parties by the developer, the declaration’s effects stay with the
land regardless of in whose hands the unit or property ultimately ends
up.79
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, for most of the early
years of a development’s life, the association—through the careful
drafting of the declaration—is controlled by the developer.80 The
developer decides if and when the declaration will be amended or
enforced and whether additional requirements or assessments may be
imposed.81 Then, once a certain percentage of the overall units or
parcels within the development are sold to third parties, control over
the declaration will be transferred from the developer to the individual
owners who will then elect the board of directors themselves.82
The powers that are granted by the declaration can be quite
extensive.83 “They typically purport to regulate such issues as
76. See Brian Jason Fleming, Regulation of Political Signs in Private
Homeowner Associations: A New Approach, 59 VAND. L. REV. 571, 578–79 (2006).
77. See Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and “Reasonableness” in
Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. L. J.
41, 47 (1990).
78. See Callies, supra note 20, at 325–26 (“A major user of such real covenants
is the property developer of large residential communities who wishes to guarantee a
certain measure of uniformity (or difference) in the houses that make up its projected
residential community.”).
79. See id. at 326.
80. See Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners Associations: A Reply, 130 U
PA. L. REV. 1589, 1592–96 (1982); see also Callies, supra note 20, at 326.
81. Natelson, supra note 77, at 47.
82. See Callies, supra note 20, at 326 (“Sometime following the selling of the
last lot (or the construction of the last home if the developer is building them) the
developer transfers the enforcement function to some sort of association of
homeowners . . . .”); see also Wilbert Washington, II, A Model Homeowners
Association Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, 23 No. 4 PRAC.
REAL EST. LAW. 23, 29–32 (2007).
83. See Wiseman, supra note 40, at 711–13 (“The homeowners moving to these
communities, if seeking only an affordable living space, are likely vaguely aware that
general zoning regulations of the municipality apply but may be surprised by the
detailed set of additional rules that they encounter. To create this community, a
developer (sometimes unbeknownst to the buyer), first bargains with the city or
county government that has jurisdiction over the land, providing infrastructure and
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architectural design, fencing, use of structures, use of common areas,
and the subdivision of lots.”84 Often times these restrictions are far
more strict and limiting than those that are imposed by the local
government.85 Such highly restrictive covenants include those that
dictate the style of home, the color of exterior walls, the use of satellite
televisions, the number of guests of an owner that may be present at
any given time, the style of mailbox, and even the size and type of
gardens and landscaping that are allowed.86 By creating such a
restrictive regime, these CCRs create a system that reduces “both the
search costs involved in finding like-minded individuals and the risk of
regret that would be suffered should one discover, after making an
expensive home purchase, that the neighborhood is less hospitable than
originally assumed.”87
That is not to say that the micro-governments created by these
declarations always accomplish their goals.88 As stated above, typically
the legal foundation of these heavy-handed limitations and restrictions
other amenities in exchange for approval. The developer then obtains approval of a
plat and subdivision plan and drafts the private rules for the community, most of
which are contained within the declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions,
and then records the declaration prior to the sale of the first lot. The declaration is
binding upon all current and future property owners as well as the property owners’
or homeowners’ association, which is the community’s governing body.
Accompanying the covenants are the architectural or design review guidelines, which
are also typically adopted by the developer and place additional restrictions on
property use. Finally, bylaws are adopted by the association’s board of directors.
These substantially affect residents’ rights, particularly by setting some of the
procedures that the board must follow in modifying or enforcing rules. Combined, the
architectural review guidelines, covenants, and bylaws form a complex set of
limitations on individual uses of property and define the framework within which
homeowners may influence those rules.”).
84. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1384–85.
85. See, e.g., Murphy v. Timber Trace Ass’n, 779 S.W.2d 603, 607–08 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989).
86. See Linn Valley Lakes Property Owners Ass’n v. Brockway, 824 P.2d 948,
949 (Kan. 1992); McGuire v. Bell, 761 S.W.2d. 904, 911 (Ark. 1988); Miller v. First
Colony Cmty. Servs. Ass’n, No. 01-92-00132-CV, 1993 WL 331092, at *1 (Tex.
App. Aug. 31, 1993); West Hill Colony, Inc. v. Sauerwein, 138 N.E.2d 403, 404
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956); Cottrell v. Miskove, 605 S.2d 572, 573–74 (Fla. Dist. App.
1992); Forest Glen Cmty. Homeowners Ass’n v. Nolan, 432 N.E.2d 636, 637–38 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1982); see also Robert D. Brussack, Group Homes, Families, and Meaning
in the Law of Subdivision Covenants, 16 GA. L. REV. 33, 46–48 (1981).
87. Gillette, supra note 49, at 1395 (citing EDNA ULLMANN-MARGALIT, THE
EMERGENCE OF NORMS 104–09 (Oxford 1977)).
88. Brussack, supra note 86, at 34–40. See also Glen O. Robinson, Explaining
Contingent Rights: The Puzzle of “Obsolete” Covenants, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 546
(1991); James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L.
REV. 1, 7–16 (1989).
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are based in the law of servitudes and building restrictions.89 However,
because of the many affirmative obligations imposed upon the parties,
as well as the many regulations that do not technically “touch and
concern” the land, declarations can sometimes exceed what is legally
permissible.90 These types of overreaching restrictions are particularly
subject to attack due to the general public policy of keeping property in
commerce and the more general property law directive that discourages
unreasonable restrictions and restraints on real property.91
Nevertheless, the use of declarations has been prolific across the
United States, and it is almost impossible to find a real estate
development—residential, commercial, industrial, or otherwise—that
does not have a comprehensive set of covenants, conditions, and
restrictions imposed upon it.92
C. Lending and Control
For all their merits and pitfalls, the types of developments
discussed above would not be possible without the participation of
many lenders and financers who share the developer’s desire to not
only see the project become successful but also profitable.93 Real estate
89. See Gillette, supra note 49, at 1386–87; see also Mountain Park
Homeowners Ass’n v. Tydings, 864 P.2d 392, 395 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), aff’d en
banc, 883 P.2d 1383 (Wash. 1994); Lookout Mountain Paradise Hills Homeowners’
Ass’n v. Viewpoint Assocs., 867 P.2d 70, 74 (Colo. App. 1993).
90. Natelson, supra note 77, at 50–51; Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervision of
Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1978). Although Louisiana commentators do not
follow the covenants theory utilized at common law and have acknowledged that
predial servitudes and building restrictions can be used to create both negative and
affirmative obligations, which are deemed real rights, issues still arise as to whether
comprehensive declarations nonetheless exceed what is allowable under the law. See
A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 229, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 449–
54 (4th ed. 2001).
91. See Christopher K. Odinet, Comment, Laying to Rest an Ancien Régime:
Antiquated Institutions in Louisiana Civil Law and Their Incompatibility with Modern
Public Policies, 70 LA. L. REV. 1367 (2010); see also Sally Brown Richardson,
Nonuse and Easements: Creating a Pliability Regime of Private Eminent Domain, 78
TENN. L. REV. 1 (2010); Winokur, supra note 88, at 7–16; Ritchie v. Carriage Oaks
Homeowners Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992); Woodcreek Ass’n v.
Bingle, 597 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ohio. App. 1991); Barber v. Dixon, 302 S.E.2d 915,
916–17 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Wisneiwski v. Starr, 393 So. 2d 488, 489 (Ala. 1980).
92. Steven Siegel, The Public Role in Establishing Private Residential
Communities: Towards a New Formulation of Local Government Land Use Policies
that Eliminates the Legal Requirements to Privatize New Communities in the United
States, 38 URB. LAW. 859, 867 (2006).
93. See MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY R. DWYER, & STEVEN W. BENDER, 1 LAW
OF REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3:1 (2013) (“Unlike the stock market, the primary
mortgage market is not a series of organized forums but a time-place continuum of
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lenders range in size and scope depending on the market and the type
of development.94 For instance, life insurance companies are
traditionally the leaders in providing permanent financing for shopping
malls, apartment complexes, and office buildings.95 Commercial
banks, usually through a larger syndication with other lenders, and the
collateral-mortgage-backed securities market provide the largest source
of real estate financing in the country for short-term construction
loans.96 And real estate investment trusts (commonly called “REITs”)97
are highly sought-after lenders—particularly for hard-pressed
borrowers and those seeking secondary financing—because of their
willingness to take risks and the meager amount of governmental
regulation that restricts their activities.98 And still there are other less
traditional but still active real estate lenders such as private noninsured
pension funds, governmental credit agencies, retirement and pension
funds, certain corporations, and even individuals whose liability
structure is well suited to long-term financing.99
Regardless of the type of lender for a given development, the goal
is the same: to ensure that the loan performs and is profitable.100 This

interrelated lending points where bargains are struck by borrowers and lenders as to
loan amounts and interest rates.”).
94. Id. (“The diversity within the mortgage market is reflected by preferences
among lenders for mortgages for new versus old buildings; low-income versus luxury
housing; urban versus rural real estate; private versus public ownership; improved
versus unimproved land; general- versus special-purpose-use property (e.g., churches
and bowling alleys), and so on.”).
95. See id. § 3:9.
96. Id. § 3:25. See also GERALD LINS, RITA KUMMER & THOMAS LEMKE,
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET (2012–2013 ed).
97. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 856–60 (2006).
98. See MADISON ET AL., supra note 93, § 3:26 (“REITs derive their existence
from a 1960 amendment to the Code that permits these entities to pay out cash flow
distributions to trust shareholders without the imposition of a corporate tax on the
earnings of the trust. This singular benefit of avoiding the double-taxation
disadvantage of corporate taxation is accomplished mechanically by allowing a
qualified REIT to take a deduction for dividends paid (including capital gain
dividends) in computing its taxable income. However, in contrast to a partnership, a
Subchapter S corporation, and a limited-liability company, a REIT cannot pass
through its tax losses to the equity owners (shareholders) who own the beneficial
interests in the corporation or trust.”).
99. Id. § 3:27 (“Another important group of players are foreign investors . . . .
Their ability to compete with U.S. investors has strengthened because of their access
to lower cost capital, more favorable exchange rates, and more modest expectations
as to rates of return.”).
100. See ALVIN ARNOLD, REAL ESTATE INVESTOR’S DESKBOOK § 1:8 (2013)
(“Real estate investments have almost always been the basis for more great fortunes
than any other type of investment.”); see also id. § 4:7 (“A real estate lender, whether
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aim is the principal driver for which types of demand are made on the
borrower in terms of conditions, covenants, warranties, and obligations
in the loan documentation process.101 In addition, numerous laws and
regulations dictate the type of risks that financial lenders are allowed to
take when making real-estate-related loans.102 Some of the basic
agreements between the parties will be settled at the outset.103 For
instance, the market forces and competition with other lenders
typically bring the question of the interest rate to a conclusion early on,
as well as the long-term amortization structure of the debt service
requirements.104
However, there are other matters—matters that implicate the CCR
declaration structure discussed above—which can cause friction
between the parties.105 The lender will be first and foremost concerned
with the loan being sufficiently secured by the real estate collateral.106
The lender will always be on guard for “incompetent management or
fraudulent practices that milk the property during the loan term” and
thereby “significantly reduce the value of the security.”107 To this end,
the lender will almost always require that the borrower grant a mortgage
on the property itself so that in the event there is a default, the
development—including the improvements—can be seized and sold.108
it is an institution (e.g., bank, thrift, or life insurance company) or a private or
commercial lender (e.g., corporate financing company or real estate syndicate), has
one primary objective: to determine the ability of the borrower to pay periodic debt
service on the loan as well as any principal balance remaining at loan maturity. The
lender begins with the borrower’s application, which should give a detailed
description of both the property and the borrowers as well as a clear statement of the
financing requested.”).
101. See id.
102. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101–73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as scattered sections of Titles 12
and 15 of the U.S.C.A.); see also Donald Wood, Loye W. Young, Frederick Frost &
Pamela Nichols, An Overview of FIRREA, 6 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW 43, 44–49 (July
1990); Marc S. Lowenthal, Gerald W. McEvoy, John M. Rolls, Jr. & Nicholas J.
Wood, The Impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on Lending Practices and Procedures of Savings Institutions,
26 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577 (1991).
103. See ARNOLD, supra note 100, § 4:3.
104. Id. (“Many lenders, for example, see eye-to-eye with the borrower about the
desirability of high-ratio, long-term loans with low amortization on high-quality real
estate, since the security for the loan cannot be faulted and the lender has minimum loan
turnover, which reduces its overhead and operating expenses.”).
105. Id. These issues can generally revolve around, among other things, guarding
against inflation and damage to the collateral. See id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. STUART M. SAFT, COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 9:19 (3d. ed.
2013).
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The proceeds from the sale can then be applied against the outstanding
debt owed by the borrower.109 The real estate that is offered as collateral
for the loan is, quite often, far more important than the financial or
economic strength of the borrower himself.110 During the loan approval
phase, the lender will go to great lengths to analyze and investigate the
property to ensure its value and whether it is viable as an incomeproducing enterprise.111
In a perfect world, the lender is able to fully recover the debt from
the seizure and sale of the property.112 In reality, however, the sale of
the collateral rarely results in a third-party buyer who pays an amount
sufficient to satisfy the debt.113 This is no less true in Louisiana.114
What often happens is that the lender itself purchases the property at
the sheriff’s foreclosure sale and thereby becomes the owner for a

109. Id. (“A mortgage or a deed of trust is any written instrument creating a lien
on real property or by which title to the real property is held as security for the
repayment of a debt.”). In Louisiana, only the mortgage is recognized as a valid
conventional security interest in immovable property. See PETER S. TITLE, 1
LOUISIANA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 13:17, in 1 LOUISIANA PRACTICE SERIES
1109 (2013–2014 ed.). Neither deeds of trust, nor mortgages with a power of sale, are
recognized in Louisiana. See generally id.
110. See ARNOLD, supra note 100, § 4:8.
111. Id.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 8.1–.6 (1997).
113. Id. § 8.3 cmt. a.
Many commentators have observed that the foreclosure process
commonly fails to produce the fair market value for foreclosed real estate
. . . . There are several reasons for low bids at foreclosure sales. First,
because the mortgage lender can “credit bid” up to the amount of the
mortgage obligation without putting up new cash, it has a distinct bidding
advantage over a potential third party bidder. Second, while foreclosure
legislation usually requires published notice to potential third party
purchasers, this notice, especially in urban areas, is frequently published
in the classified columns of legal newspapers with limited circulation.
Moreover, because the publication is usually highly technical,
unsophisticated potential bidders have little idea as to the nature of the
real estate being sold. Third, many potential third party purchasers are
reluctant to buy land at a foreclosure sale because of the difficulty in
ascertaining whether the sale will produce a good and marketable title and
the absence of any warranty of title or of physical quality from the
foreclosing mortgagee. Finally, when a mortgagee forecloses on improved
real estate, potential bidders may find it difficult to inspect the premises
prior to sale. Even though it may be in the self-interest of the mortgagor to
allow such persons to inspect the premises, mortgagors who are about to
lose their real estate through a foreclosure sale understandably are
frequently reluctant to cooperate.
Id.
114. See Michael H. Rubin & Jamie D. Seymour, Deficiency Judgments: An
Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 783 (2009).
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period of time.115 During this time, it is in the lender’s best interest to
ensure that the property maintains or increases in value and that cash
flow continues or is augmented.116 If the value of the property remains
high or is increased, the proceeds from the sale to a subsequent
purchaser are likely to be more significant and thereby aid in helping
the lender recover the loss from the failed loan.117 Similarly,
continuous cash flow is equally important because, at least until the
property can be sold, the bank can use the income produced from the
property to mitigate its losses and pay for ongoing expenses.118 If the
development is a residential subdivision, the continuous sale of lots,
and the proceeds therefrom, are extremely desirable to the bank.119
Also, if the development is an office building or shopping center, the
lender will want to ensure the continued payment of rents and the
procuring of new tenants for vacant spaces.120
Nevertheless, all of these goals and desires of the lender that
becomes the owner of the collateral after foreclosure depend upon the
lender maintaining control over the development. Prior to the default and
subsequent foreclosure, the developer has control and is able to regulate,
guide, and direct the activities and management of the development
through the various powers under the declaration.121 If common areas of
the development—such as parking spaces or a community swimming
pool—were in need of repair, the developer could charge a special, onetime assessment against all the parcels or units to produce quick cash to
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 8.3 (1997).
116. See FANNIE MAE, PROPERTY MAINTENANCE & MANAGEMENT: PROPERTY
PRESERVATION MATRIX (2012), available at https://www.fanniemae.com/content
/tool/property-preservation-matrix.pdf [http://perma.cc/9EUN-E69E] (archived Mar.
10, 2014); see also Matthew S. Kirsch, How Low Can They Go: Remediating Bank
Activity Restrictions and Incentives to Facilitate the Responsible Divestiture of REO
Property, 41 REAL EST. L.J. 4 (2012). “REO (real estate-owned) properties” are those
that are owned by a lender after a foreclosure where no third-party bidder purchased
the property. See id.
117. Stephen L. Poe, Sale of REO Properties Under CERCLA: An Area of
Continuing Environmental Risk for Lenders, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 43 (1991).
118. For a discussion on the importance of income-producing property to a lender,
see MADISON ET AL., supra note 93, § 1:1.
119. See, e.g., Treatment of Real Estate Acquired Through Foreclosure Under the
OTS’s Risk-Based Capital Regulations, Fed. Banking L. Rep. ¶ 82,584 (CCH), 1992
WL 12610531 (Jan. 23, 1992).
120. See Thomas C. Homburgera & Lawrence A. Eiben, Who’s On FirstProtecting the Commercial Mortgage Lender: A Lender’s Overview of
Subordination, Nondisturbance, and Attornment Agreements, 36 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 411, 411 (2001) (“The true value of commercial real estate is determined
largely by the capitalization of its net income. . . . Lenders must consider, at a
minimum, the obligations and liabilities of the parties under the leases, the right of
successors-in-title to the real estate to benefit from the leases, and the extent to which
the all-important rental income can be reduced, offset, or interrupted.”).
121. See supra Part I.B and accompanying discussion.
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fund the repairs.122 If the activities of certain owners and their guests
were unruly or undesirable, the developer could use his or her powers
under the declaration to promulgate rules to prohibit such activity.123
Everything from guidelines on what types and styles of improvements
homeowners in the subdivision can construct on their lots to the type of
alarm systems and wall paint a tenant can utilize within its office space
can fall within the purview of the declaration and thereby under the
control of the developer.124 This authority bestows great power on the
developer to ensure that the vision of quality, beauty, and aesthetic that
was initially envisioned for the development remains, even after
possession or ownership of certain portions of the project have been sold
to third parties.125
The importance of controlling the declaration is no less important
to lenders.126 This is particularly evident when they become the owners
of the property after a foreclosure sale.127 The lender needs to ensure
that the property is carefully regulated, its activities are coordinated,
and its value maintained so that any losses from the nonperforming
loan can be offset by income produced from—or the proceeds from the
eventual sale of—the property.128 In order to achieve these essential
objectives, the lender will very often require that, when the loan is
made, the borrower not only grant a mortgage on all of the real
property and improvements of the development but also grant a
security right in the declaration itself.129 In this case, when the
122. See supra Part I.B.
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See supra Part I.B.
125. See supra Part I.B.
126. See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Elizabeth A. Kelly & John Travis
Marshall, Crisis Management: Principles That Should Guide the Disposition of
Federally Owned, Foreclosed Properties, 45 IND. L. REV. 305 (2012).
127. See generally Julie A. Tappendorf & Brent O. Denzin, Turning Vacant
Properties into Community Assets Through Land Banking, 43 URB. LAW. 801 (2011).
128. For a discussion of the importance and utility of declarations of covenants,
restrictions, and conditions in real estate developments, see supra Part I.B.
129. See, e.g., Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for
Lockwood Folly, art. I, § 11, available at http://www.lockwoodfollypoa.org/PDF
/MDCDocs/Section%203%20MASTER%20DECLARATION%20OF%20COVE
NANTS%2042012%20(2).pdf [http://perma.cc/NB5Q-N95T] (archived Mar. 10,
2014) (“The Declarant may assign or pledge any or all of its rights reserved under the
land use documents through an assignment or in an instrument of conveyance or
assignment.” (emphasis added)); Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions of Wyncroft, Ex. A, item (g), available at http://www.wyncroft.org
/WHA%20Covenants%20with%20Amend%201.pdf [http://perma.cc/4HTP-NGNQ ]
(archived Mar. 17, 2014) (“Declarant shall have the right and power to assign and
delegate to the respective associations, or any successor or successors thereto, at any
time and from time to time, all or any part of any of the rights, powers, and authority
contained in this Declaration.” (emphasis added)). For an example of such a clause in
Louisiana, see Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Segnette
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borrower defaults and the lender forecloses on the mortgage, the lender
can also exercise its rights under the declaration. The mechanics and
effects of such an exercise of security rights by the lender are discussed
below and underscore the crucial role that the declaration plays even
after the development is foreclosed upon.
II. COLLATERALIZING CONTROL
While the declaration provides a wide range of powers and
advantages to a lender in the event the property must be obtained or
taken over by the lender in a foreclosure sale, it is not always easy or
clear how such a complex and multifaceted instrument like a
declaration can be collateralized. As discussed here, declarations
comprise a myriad of different legal concepts and doctrines that help
make the common-interest regime possible. But it is this complexity
that makes collateralizing the rights so difficult. In fact, because so
many different types of property rights are involved in the construction
and functionality of declarations, in most cases these rights cannot be
collectively collateralized in one omnibus security device. Rather, each
different aspect of the declaration must be collateralized and dealt with
separately.
A. Under Mortgage Law—Immovable Aspects of CCRs
The first and perhaps most obvious type of security device to be
used in collateralizing declaration rights is under Louisiana’s law of
mortgages because of the essential role played in CCRs by building
restrictions and servitudes (both immovables). Without question, CCRs
comprise a number of servitudes and building restrictions that are
essential in giving the goals of the declaration enforceability under the
law.130 Without these legal devices, few if any of the limitations and
rules within a declaration would have any effect at all.131 A building
restriction in the declaration might prevent an owner from building a
fence out of chain link on his or her property, or a servitude might
grant to the owners’ association the right to traverse an owner’s yard in

Estates, Article XIII, available at http://www.rad65.com/Segnette%20Estates/SE.
Declaration_conditions_restrictions.pdf [http://perma.cc/6XXG-JRC9] (archived
Mar. 10, 2014) (“Declarant’s Rights. Any or all of the special rights and obligations
of the Declarant set forth in this Declaration or the By-Laws may be transferred in
whole or in part to other Persons.” (emphasis added)).
130. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 192, in 4 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE 512 (3d ed. 2004). See also Callies, supra note 20, at 325–27.
131. See Callies, supra note 20, at 325–27.
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order to conduct maintenance on a carefully preserved live oak tree.132
However, the combination of these two devices to achieve the goals of
a declaration has not always been so readily accepted.133
As a general matter, negative restrictions and restraints imposed by
a declaration—such as a prohibition on erecting a structure within a
certain number of feet from the street or right-of-way—have been
widely accepted by Louisiana courts.134 Provided they meet all the
necessary legal requirements, these restrictions are characterized as
predial servitudes, and the negative obligations that are entailed in
them are real rights that travel with the land into whosever hands it
finds itself.135 Therefore, the developer may include certain restrictions
on the uses, height, and size of improvements in the declaration and
impose those restrictions, through the use of predial servitudes,
throughout the development.136 As lots are individually sold, the
predial servitudes stay in place and continue to burden the property
even though the developer no longer has an ownership interest in the
parcels.137
However, for many years the notion of imposing real rights that
carried affirmative obligations was met with great uncertainty.138
French courts attempted to give enforceability to these types of
restrictions by expanding the notion of personal obligations and the
transfer of related immovable property.139 Louisiana courts, however,
took a different approach and created a sort of special real right that
has become known as the “building restriction.”140 These devices—

132. For discussion of the various instances of such restrictions, see Patrick
Johnson, Jr., The Civil Code Articles on Building Restrictions: A Critical Analysis, 53
TUL. L. REV. 583 (1979); Martin Smith, Jr., Building Restrictions in Louisiana, 21
LA. L. REV. 468 (1961). See also Louisiana Homeowners Association Act, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.4–.6 (2008).
133. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 192, at 512. See also Callies, supra note
20, at 325–27.
134. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 229, at 449–54 (citing Goodwin v.
Alexander, 30 So. 102 (La. 1901); CIVIL CODE [C. CIV.] art. 689 (Fr.); 3 M. PLANIOL
ET G. RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS: LES BIENS, § 923, in 3
DROIT CIVIL (2d ed. Picard 1952); ASTIKOS KODIKAS [A.K.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1120
(Greece); Balis, Civil Law Property 315 (3d ed. 1955) (in Greek); cf. BURGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH [B.G.B.] § 1018 (Ger.); W. DEHNER, § 31 in NACHBARRECHT IM
BUNDESGEBIET § 31 28II (6th ed. 1982). See also McGuffy v. Weil, 125 So. 2d 154
(La. 1960); cf. Holloway v. Ransome, 43 So. 2d 673 (La. 1949)).
135. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 229, at 449–54.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See Cambais v. Douglas, 120 So. 369 (La. 1929).
139. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 229, at 449–54.
140. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 191, at 376–81. See also Willis v. New
Orleans East Unit of Jehovah’s Witnesses, Inc., 156 So. 2d 310 (La. Ct. App. 1963);
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often explained as being closely akin to predial servitudes—were
described as “charges on immovable property imposed ‘in pursuant of
a general plan governing building standards, specified uses, and
improvements.’”141 Finally, a formal statutory regime, patterned after
the framework that had been developed by Louisiana courts, was
adopted by the Legislature in 1977 through the enactment of Civil
Code articles 775 through 783.142 The true utility of these devices is
their ability to impose affirmative duties, such that the declarant can
force individual owners of parcels or units that are encumbered with
the restriction to perform affirmative acts.143 Much like the use of CCR
declarations across the United States, building restrictions (covenants),
in combination with predial servitudes (easements), have been
considered one of the most important tools for real estate development
in Louisiana and are largely, if not completely, responsible for the
enforceability of CCRs.144
However, that is not to say that building restrictions provide free
reign to developers.145 As long recognized by Louisiana courts, parties
are not free to create whatever real rights they wish.146 Rather, as
articulated by the Romans, real rights are “numerous clausus,”
meaning that they are a closed class and a category unto themselves.147
Private individuals are generally not given carte blanche to
contractually create whatever unique type of real right that may suit
their needs.148 Although courts have allowed for some exceptions—

Cunningham v. Hall, 148 So. 2d 808 (La. Ct. App. 1963); Cmty. Builders, Inc. v.
Scarborough, 149 So. 2d 141 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
141. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 191, at 376–81 (quoting LA. CIV. CODE
art. 775).
142. See id.
143. See Martin Smith, Jr., Building Restrictions in Louisiana, 21 LA. L. REV. 468
(1961); Eugene G. Taggart, “Equitable Restrictions” in Louisiana, 33 TUL. L. REV.
822 (1959); see also M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANÇAIS: LES BIENS § 923 (2d ed. 1952).
144. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 191, at 376–81; see also Callies,
supra note 20, at 325–26; TITLE, supra note 109, §§ 3:48–:49.
145. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 217, at 414–17 and accompanying
discussion of the numerous clausus.
146. See id.; cf. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 67 So. 641, 728–29 (La.
1915) (“[W]hile the public policy of the state opposes the putting of property out of
commerce, it at the same time favors the fullest liberty of contract (article 1764, C.
C.), and the widest latitude possible in the right to dispose of one's property as one
lists (article 491, C. C.), so long as no disposition is sought to be made contrary to
good morals, public order, or express law.”).
147. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 216, at 413–14 (citing Pugliese, Diritti
Reali, in Enciclopedia del Diritto (1964); Weisman, Some Fundamental Concepts of
Property Law: A Critical Survey, 21 ISR. L. REV. 529, 565 (1986)).
148. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 217, at 414–17.
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such as in the case of mineral rights, limited personal servitudes, and
building restrictions prior to codification149—for the most part such
free contractual license has been looked upon negatively.150 In a
seminal case, the Louisiana Supreme Court praised Louisiana’s
property law system as being “that of simple, uniform and absolute
dominion” and said that its narrow and limited statutory allowances for
the creation of real rights are “abundantly sufficient to meet all the
warrants of civilization, and there is no warrant of law, nor reason of
policy for the introduction of any other.”151
In the context of building restrictions, there are a few important
requirements that can often be overlooked—and therefore destroy the
entire regime.152 First is the need for a general plan of development, and
equally important is that this plan must be “feasible and capable of being
preserved.”153 Restrictions that are ambiguous or vague will be denied
enforcement.154 Another essential requirement is that the imposition of
the building restrictions must be fairly uniform across the entire
development.155 A failure of uniformity may cause the building
restriction to fall into the category of a predial servitude, and if it fails to
meet the requirements for such a servitude, the restriction will fail
altogether.156 Lastly and most importantly, the ability to impose
149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (2009) (“Unless expressly or impliedly
prohibited from doing so, individuals may renounce or modify what is established in
their favor by the provisions of this Code if the renunciation or modification does not
affect the rights of others and is not contrary to the public good.”). See also A. N.
YIANNOPOULOS, PERSONAL SERVITUDES §§ 223–31, in 3 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW
TREATISE 455–77 (4th ed. 2000); YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, §§ 191–200, at
511–35.
150. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 217, at 414–17 (stating that courts have
repeatedly declared that “the modifications of the right of property under our laws are
few and easily understood, and answer all the purposes of reasonable use. It is
incumbent on courts to maintain them in their simplicity.” (citing Harper v.
Stanbrough, 2 La. Ann. 377, 382 (La. 1847))). See also Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas
Co., 97 So. 666, 668 (La. 1923).
151. See State v. McDonogh’s Ex’rs, 8 La. Ann. 171, 251 (La. 1853).
152. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 193, at 515–19.
153. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 775 (2014); see also Schwab v. Kelton, 405 So. 2d
1239 (La. Ct. App. 1981); Gwatney v. Miller, 371 So. 2d 1355 (La. Ct. App. 1979);
Bruce v. Simonson Invs., Inc., 207 So. 2d 360 (La. 1968); Salerno v. De Lucca, 30
So. 2d 678 (La. 1947); Alfortish v. Wagner, 7 So. 2d 708 (La. 1942).
154. See Olivier v. Berggren, 136 So. 2d 325 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
155. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 195, at 523. See also Murphy v. Marino,
60 So. 2d 128 (La. Ct. App. 1952); In re Congregation of St. Rita Roman Catholic
Church, 130 So. 2d 425 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (imposing restrictions on only 40% of
the parcels within the development was not enough to satisfy the requirements for
valid building restrictions of the lots); Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So. 2d 554 (La. Ct.
App. 1958); cf. Rabouin v. Dutrey, 160 So. 393 (La. 1935).
156. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 193, at 515.
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affirmative duties is not without limit.157 Any affirmative acts must be
“reasonable and necessary for the maintenance of the general plan.”158
The requirement that owners become members of a collective
association and the requirement that they accept the duty to share in the
cost and expenses of maintaining common areas have both been deemed
valid affirmative building restrictions by Louisiana courts.159 However,
requiring acts, the demand of which are subject to the capricious
discretion of the declarant or that restrict the property to the detriment
of public policy, are not valid.160
Building restrictions161 and servitudes,162 as discussed above, are
both classified as incorporeal immovables under the Louisiana Civil
Code.163 This is because both building restrictions and servitudes can
only affect immovable property.164 When “the object of a real right is
an immovable, the right is an incorporeal immovable.”165 In the
context of a declaration, the object of the real right is the land upon
which the common interest community will be constructed.166 Because
the land is a corporeal immovable, the real rights associated with it are
incorporeal immovables.167

157. See id. § 195, at 523.
158. LA. CIV. CODE art. 778 (2014). See also Louisiana Homeowners Association
Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1141.4–.6 (1999); Allen Scott Crigler, Some
Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 LA. L. REV. 1201, 1208 (1981).
159. See Town S. Estates Homes Ass’n, Inc. v. Walker, 332 So. 2d 889 (La. Ct.
App. 1976) (upholding annual assessments); Nepveaux v. Linwood Realty Co., 435
So. 2d 589, 591 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding restrictions stating that “[a]ny house
erected . . . shall have a minimum cost of $40,000.00 and 2,200 square feet”).
However, interestingly, Louisiana courts have held that the failure to pay assessments
is a personal obligation of the owner that remains with the owner, even after the
owner has sold the property that is burdened with the real right that imposed the fee in
the first place. See Vill. Square Shopping Ctr. Ass’n v. Nelson, 522 So. 2d 163 (La.
Ct. App. 1988); see also Mariner’s Vill. Master Ass’n, Inc. v. Cont’l Props., 639 So.
2d 1188 (La. Ct. App. 1994); A. N. Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private
Things, 37 LA. L. REV. 317, 329–30 (1977); cf. Tall Timbers Owners’ Ass’n v.
Merritt, 376 So. 2d 586 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
160. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 195, at 523.
161. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 777 (2014).
162. See id. art. 649; A. N. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles:
Louisiana and Comparative Law, 29 LA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1968); YIANNOPOULOS, supra
note 130, § 6, at 18.
163. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337. See also Callies, supra note
20, at 325–26.
164. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337.
165. Id. at 338.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Immovable rights can only be collateralized through the use of a
mortgage.168 This is because of Louisiana’s exclusivity approach to the
types of property that can be mortgaged.169 Civil law countries, even
more so than their common law cousins, take a very narrow view of
the types of rights that can be created in property.170 As such,
Louisiana law only allows for five categories of property that may be
made subject to a mortgage, and any other attempts to expand this list
through contract is ineffective.171 Louisiana Civil Code article 3286
limits mortgage to only (1) corporeal immovable property, including
its component parts; (2) rights of usufruct with respect to a corporeal
immovable; (3) a servitude of right of use, including any
accompanying rights associated with buildings and other constructions
located on the land subject to the servitude; (4) a lessee’s rights in a
lease of an immovable, including the rights to any buildings or other
constructions located on the leased land; and (5) any additional
property that might be made available for mortgaging through a special
enactment of the legislature.172 Although not specifically stated in
article 3286, building restrictions—due to being substantially similar to
servitudes and also comprising real rights in a corporeal immovable—
may also be encumbered by a mortgage.173
Thus, the portions of the declaration that consist of building
restrictions and servitudes must be collateralized under the law of
mortgage.174 The lender will typically already have a conventional
mortgage on the real estate comprising the development itself in
connection with making the loan.175 And the encumbrance of the land
automatically includes any and all building restrictions and servitudes
that might exist on the property.176 Nevertheless, when encumbering
168. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3286 (2014); see also Voorhies v. De Blanc, 12 La.
Ann. 864 (La. 1857).
169. See art. 3286; Miller v. Michoud, 11 Rob. 225 (La. 1845); Penn v. Ott, 12 La.
Ann. 233 (La. 1857); State v. Mexican Gulf Ry. Co., 3 Rob. 513 (La. 1843).
170. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and
Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 373 (2002) (“The law of every jurisdiction defines a set of wellrecognized forms that property rights can take and burdens the creation of property
rights that deviate from those conventional forms. In this respect, property law differs
from contract law, which generally leaves parties free to craft contractual rights in any
form they wish. Scholars in civil law countries have long been self-conscious about
the law’s constraints on property rights.”).
171. Art. 3286.
172. Id.
173. See generally YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337.
174. Art. 3286. See also Coguenhem v. Trosclair, 69 So. 800 (La. 1915).
175. See generally Alfred G. Kyle, Commercial Real Estate Construction
Lending, 22 PRAC. REAL EST. LAW 7 (2006).
176. LA. CIV. CODE art. 650 (2014). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1051
(2008).
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the CCR declaration—which is itself a separate piece of collateral from
the land—it may be desirable to separately describe the servitudes and
building restrictions, not because this is legally required, but rather to
make clear the intent of the parties and to put courts and third parties
on notice of the parties’ intent and the scope of the mortgage.177
Because the real rights being collateralized under the CCRs are so
complex and particular to these types of transactions, the specific
building restrictions and servitudes that are set forth in the declaration
should be described with specificity in the mortgage document.178 In
this way, the mortgagee (the lender) and the mortgagor (the developer–
owner) are able to evidence the intent behind the security contract with
regard to the exact nature of the rights being mortgaged—specifically
that they are being collateralized as part of the larger collateralization
of the CCRs.179
The lender will have to ensure that when portions of the
development are released from the mortgage on the land that the
mortgage rights arising under the collateralization of the CCRs are not
similarly released. For instance, a lender might release lots within a
subdivision from the overall real estate mortgage as the developer sells
individual parcels within the neighborhood. However, until the lender
is fully paid and the debt is extinguished, it will want to maintain its
mortgage rights insofar as they impact the CCRs. This means that the
servitudes and building restrictions that continue to encumber each of
the lots, even after they are sold to independent, third-party
homeowners, must still be maintained subject to the CCR mortgage in
favor of the lender. Thus, it is desirable to mortgage these rights
separately from one another to ensure that they are not both
inadvertently released at the same time. However, there is a theoretical
problem that arises here because of the way in which Louisiana law
conceptualizes servitudes and the property to which they are
attached.180 Comment (e) to Louisiana Civil Code article 3286 states
that “[a] mortgage of the dominant estate implicitly covers all predial
servitudes belonging to it. Neither can such a servitude be mortgaged
separately.”181 Because a predial servitude cannot be encumbered
separately from the land over which it lies, creating a separate
collateralization would seem impossible.182 Under this principle, there
would be no way to prevent the release of the lender’s mortgage rights
177. See generally art. 3286.
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id. cmt. e.
181. See id.; see also id. art. 650 (“A predial servitude is inseparable from the
dominant estate and passes with it. The right of using the servitude cannot be
alienated, leased, or encumbered separately from the dominant estate.”).
182. Id. art. 650.
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over only the land, without also losing its rights in the CCRs that affect
that parcel.183 Nevertheless, it may be possible to overcome this
theoretical challenge by classifying the servitude aspects of the CCRs
as being limited personal servitudes, rather than being predial in
nature.184 Although prohibited for predial servitudes, the Civil Code
specifically sanctions the use of personal servitudes of use as collateral,
and thus it is possible to separately collateralize these types of rights
under a distinct and separate mortgage.185 This classification seems
wholly consistent with the workings of servitudes in declarations since
they essentially represent real rights that are granted in favor of a
juridical person (namely, the homeowners’ association) rather than to a
dominant estate.186 The ability to enforce setback lines and uniformity
of landscaping, among other things, are all to the benefit of the
association and its members, rather than to the actual parcels
themselves.187
Thus, while it is technically possible to include both the mortgage
of the real property and the mortgage of the servitudes and building
restrictions in the same agreement and only release certain rights for
certain purposes at certain times, it would seem more practical and
efficient to address them in separate documents to avoid error and an
inadvertent release of rights.
B. Under UCC Article 9—Movable Aspects of CCRs
Just as aspects of the CCRs comprise rights that arise in connection
with immovable property, there are other facets that might be more
183. See id.
184. See id. art. 3286.
185. Id.
186. See LaFargue v. U.S., 4 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. La. 1998) (“Louisiana law
recognizes that parties may create a personal servitude of right of use in favor of a
natural person or legal entity for a specified use of an estate less than full enjoyment.
La. C.C. art. 641. In contrast to a predial servitude, which benefits a dominant estate,
a personal servitude is for the benefit of a designated person or legal entity. However,
the right of use may confer only an advantage that may be established by a predial
servitude, id. art. 640, and such personal servitudes are regulated by the rules
governing predial servitudes to the extent that their application is compatible with the
rules governing personal servitudes. Id. art. 645.3 The Civil Code also provides that a
right of use is transferable unless prohibited by law or contract.”).
187. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 149, § 8:3, at 523–27 (explaining various
examples of limited personal servitude that may be created by private contract:
“[t]hus, the rights of passage, of aqueduct, of light, or of view, may be stipulated in
favor of a person rather than an estate. It is the same as to fishing or hunting rights,
and the taking of fruits or products from an immovable.”); see also Parish of West
Feliciana ex rel. West Feliciana Parish Police Jury v. Thompson, 2009 WL 839525, at
*1 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2009).
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appropriately classified as incorporeal movable rights.188 These rights
include contract rights that are collectively established between the unit
or lot owners and the developer pursuant to the declaration.189 As
discussed above, the exact nature of these rights have caused some
frustration among Louisiana courts because of the way in which these
rights have the effect of creating real rights that bind heirs, successors,
and assignees of the original parties to the contract but have many of
the features of personal contractual obligations.190 This distinction is
important because only certain, narrow types of rights in immovable
property can be encumbered under the law of mortgage.191 Similarly,
only rights that arise in connection with movables can be collateralized
under Louisiana’s version of article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC article 9).192 It is because of this mixed-bag of property
rights that coalesce together to form a declaration of CCRs that lenders
and their counsel are often left a bit perplexed as to how to effectively
collateralize such an important but very complex document.193
As a general matter, all rights, obligations, and actions are, in
theory, movable, but the law sometimes treats them, for legal purposes,
as immovable-related rights when the object of the right, obligation, or
action is an immovable.194 This legal fiction is articulated in Louisiana
Civil Code article 470, which declares, in part, that “[r]ights and
actions that apply to immovable things are incorporeal immovables”
and include things like servitudes and building restrictions.195 For these
rights, the law of mortgage is the correct security device.196 However,
incorporeal rights—such as the declaration rights that are more
contract based—must be collateralized under UCC article 9.197
Louisiana Civil Code article 473 states that “[r]ights, obligations, and
actions that apply to a movable thing are incorporeal movables.
Movables of this kind are such as bonds, annuities, and interest or
shares in entities possessing juridical personality.”198
One particularly important contract-based, incorporeal movable
right arising under the CCRs is the declarant’s ability to control the
association until such time as a certain number of lots or units are
188. See supra Parts I–II and accompanying discussion.
189. See supra Parts I–II.
190. See supra Part II.A.
191. See supra Part II.A.
192. See JASON J. KILBORN, LOUISIANA SECURITY DEVICES: APRÉCIS 3–4 (2006);
MICHAEL H. RUBIN, LOUISIANA LAW OF SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS 271–75
(2011).
193. See generally KILBORN, supra note 192; RUBIN, supra note 192.
194. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 146, at 337.
195. LA. CIV. CODE art. 470 (2014).
196. See supra Part II.A.
197. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 3–4; RUBIN, supra note 192, at 271–75.
198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 473 (2014).
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leased or sold to third parties.199 In other words, for a certain period of
time after construction has commenced and after the development has
been completed, the declarant will retain the ability to solely or
primarily appoint the members of the board of directors of the
association.200 By doing so, the director maintains control over the
operation, revenues, expenditures, and decision-making of the
development.201 The control rights under the declaration are akin to the
way in which a party exercises control over a corporation through
ownership of all or a majority of the shares of stock in that company.202
In this way, the declarant’s rights of control over the association are
classified as a form of incorporeal movable under Louisiana Civil
Code article 473.203
UCC article 9 incorporates the idea of using incorporeal movables
as collateral through several different types of collateral categories.204
These include the right to demand payment for services that have been
rendered or goods that have been sold or leased (accounts receivable),
the right to demand payment of money from a depositary institution
(deposit accounts), the right to recover against an individual in tort (tort
claims and judgments), and, last but not least, the catch-all category of
general intangibles.205 As discussed below, this last category—that of
general intangibles—best fits the types of contract-based rights that are
found in CCRs.206
Rights that have been held to constitute general intangibles under
the UCC article 9 analysis include rights in intellectual property, such
as copyrights, patents, and trademarks, rights under a franchise or
license agreement, causes of action (except for those arising in tort),
and goodwill.207 Importantly, the general intangible collateral category
is considered to be a catch-all, residual grouping such that if a type of
movable cannot fit under one of the other categories, it will be deemed
199. See supra Part II.B–C and accompanying discussion.
200. See supra Part II.B–C and accompanying discussion.
201. See supra Part II.B–C and accompanying discussion.
202. See GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS
§§ 14.01–.05, in 7 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 419–26 (1999).
203. See art. 473; see also Moreland v. Rucker Pharmacal Co., Inc., 59 F.R.D. 537
(W.D. La. 1973); McRoberts v. Hayes, 181 So. 2d 390 (La. 1965); Succession of
McGuire, 92 So. 40 (La. 1922).
204. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-102(a)(2), (29), (42), :9-109(d)(9), (12)
(2002); see also KILBORN, supra note 192, at 9–10.
205. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 9–10.
206. See § 10:9-102(a)(42).
207. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 10. See also § 10:9-102(a)(42) (“‘General
intangible’ means any personal property, including things in action, other than
accounts, chattel paper, tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments,
investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, life insurance policies,
and money. The term includes payment intangibles and software.”).
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to represent a form of general intangible.208 Louisiana law has little
jurisprudence interpreting the definition of “general intangibles” and
often looks to common law courts in interpreting their versions of UCC
article 9 in helping to make the determination.209 Because these CCR
contract-based rights do not fit into any of the other incorporeal
movable categories described above (i.e., accounts receivable, deposit
accounts, and tort claims/judgments), the catch-all category is most
appropriate. The residual nature of this category evidences the intent of
the drafters of UCC article 9 and courts that have interpreted it to
ensure that those particular rights in movable property that fail to meet
the more narrowly drawn parameters of the other collateral categories
nevertheless find a home in the catch-all of general intangibles.210
A slightly colorable argument may be made that the control rights
under the declaration are not really general intangible rights but are
rather a form of investment property.211 As stated above, the right to
control the association’s board of directors is arguably similar to the
declarant owning a controlling number of shares of stock in the
association.212 Investment property is another form of UCC article 9
collateral that is separate and apart from the various forms of
incorporeal movables described above. Investment property includes
securities and commodity contracts “of the kind traded in investment
markets and regulated in part by Article 8 of the UCC.”213 Shares of
stocks in a corporation are also included in this classification.214
UCC article 9 contemplates a complicated system for granting
security (both in its attachment and perfection) in investment property
that hinges, in part, on whether the property right is certificated or
uncertificated and whether it is held directly or indirectly by the
owner.215 While the right to dictate the makeup of a corporate board is
one of the rights that arises under shares of stock, stock also brings
with it various other rights—including rights to profits and a distinct
208. See Johnson v. Cottonport Bank, 259 B.R. 125 (W.D. La. 2000).
209. In re A. Angelle, Inc., 230 B.R. 287 (W.D. La. 1998) (“Although there are no
Louisiana cases on point, case law from other jurisdictions uniformly holds that
franchise agreements and licenses fall within the definition of “general intangibles.”).
See, e.g., In re Scheidmantel Olds–Cadillac, Inc., 144 B.R. 296 (W.D. Pa. 1992); In
re Topsy’s Shoppes, Inc., 131 B.R. 886, 888 (D. Kan. 1991); In re Hengalo
Enterprises, Inc., 51 B.R. 54 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
210. See generally Christopher K. Odinet, Testing the Reach of UCC Article 9:
The Question of Tax Credit Collateral in Secured Transactions, 64 S.C. L. REV. 143
(2012).
211. See § 10:9-102(a)(49).
212. See supra Part II.B.
213. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 8–9. See also 3 PETER A. ALCES ET AL.,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TRANSACTION GUIDE § 27:03 (2013).
214. KILBORN, supra note 192, at 8–9.
215. See id. at 8–9, 28–31.
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ownership interest in the legal entity itself.216 The declarant’s right to
control the board of the association is less like these other stock rights.
The declarant does not own the association due to his or her control
powers, nor does he or she derive a profit from the association in the
same way that a shareholder is entitled to dividend payments.217 In
fact, the association is almost always qualified as a tax-exempt
organization such that its operations and revenues cannot inure to the
benefit of any private individual.218 Thus, while it may be compelling
to draw a parallel between this aspect of CCRs to the rights of control
that arise in connection with shares of stock—and thus classify it as
UCC article 9 investment property—it is more accurately classified as
a form of UCC article 9 general intangible property.219 But to be safe, a
lender may choose to take a belt-and-suspenders approach and obtain a
collateral interest in the control rights of the declarant under both the
investment property method220 and under the method for collateralizing
general intangibles.221
C. Under the Law of Pledge—Gap Filling
Lastly, any discussion of the complexity and intricacies of
collateralizing a declaration of CCRs would not be complete without at
least visiting the law of pledge.222 Until the advent of UCC article 9 in
Louisiana, the Civil Code articles on the law of pledge served as the
216. MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 202, §§ 25.01–26.04, at 633–55.
217. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1141.1–.9 (Supp. 2014); see also LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1121.101–.108 (2008).
218. See Carl B. Kress, Comment, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing Restrictions
Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837 (1995);
MCKENZIE, supra note 3, at 7.
219. See ALCES ET AL., supra note 213 (“Section 9–106 of the Code treats ‘general
intangibles,’ collateral that does not fit within the other denominated categories, but
which, nevertheless, has commercial value when hypothecated to a secured party. The
majority of the cases treating collateral interests in general intangibles involve
classification issues. Because the only way to perfect a collateral interest in a general
intangible is by filing, a court’s classification of a property interest as a general
intangible may frustrate the expectations of a secured party who failed to perfect its
interest in the general intangible by filing. To protect the collateral from later
challenges, the provident creditor will consistently treat items of dubious
classification as general intangibles and file. The Official Comment to Section 9–106
lists several examples of general intangibles: goodwill, literary rights, rights to
performance copyrights, trademarks and patents. Courts have determined that the
general intangible classification is quite broad and that many property interests may
fall within the scope of the classification. Interests in general intangibles arising in the
future may be subject to the secured party’s collateral interest by including general
intangibles within the scope of the after-acquired property clause.”).
220. See KILBORN, supra note 192, at 8–9, 28–31.
221. Id. at 10, 12–19.
222. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3133–3181 (2014).
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primary vehicle by which to grant a security interest in movable
property.223 The law of pledge is steeped in civil law history and—
representative of its longevity—the pledge articles have remained
relatively unchanged since the Civil Code of 1870.224
Much like the law of mortgage and UCC article 9, a right under the
law of pledge is an accessory obligation225 that provides security for
the performance of the principle obligation.226 And, like the other two
security devices discussed above, a pledge creates a real right in the
collateral, which gives the creditor the right to seize and sell the
property in satisfaction of the debt.227 As to what types of property may
be the object of a pledge, Louisiana Civil Code article 3142 states quite
broadly that a debtor may “pledge whatever belongs to him,” which
includes any incorporeal rights he or she may have in property.228 The
various types of property that Louisiana courts have recognized as
being susceptible of pledge include, among other things, security rights
in shares of stock,229 the right to collect proceeds from a mineral
lease,230 and even crops.231 And, setting aside UCC article 9, because
the movable aspects of CCRs are incorporeal, they too may be the
object of a contract of pledge.232
However, one particularly interesting characteristic of the law of
pledge is that it has historically required that the creditor maintain
possession of the movable collateral in order to maintain his or her

223. In actuality, pledge is meant to encompass both pawn (the pledge of
movables) and antichresis (the pledge of an immovable). However, for purposes of
the article, the term “pledge” is used to mean the granting of a security interest under
the law of pledge is only a movable. This is the common use of the term because
antichresis has been so seldom used in modern Louisiana history. See id. art. 3134;
see also id. art. 3135 (“A thing is said to be pawned when a movable thing is given as
security; and the antichresis, when the security given consists in immovables.”). It
should be noted that, as of this writing, the Louisiana State Law Institute is
recommending a comprehensive revision to the law of pledge to clarify and update
its rather dated provisions.
224. See RUBIN, supra note 192, at 61; see also Succession of Lanaux, 15 So. 708,
711–12 (La. 1894) (“The symbol of the pledge, in the Roman law, is the fist of the
creditor closed on the pledge, denoting that actual possession which all recognize as
linked to the pledge, and without which none can exist.”).
225. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3137 (2014).
226. See id. art. 3136.
227. See id. arts. 3133–3181; see also RUBIN, supra note 192, at 61.
228. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3142 (2014).
229. New Orleans Nat. Banking Ass’n v. Wiltz, 10 F. 330 (E.D. La. 1881).
230. Grace-Cajun Oil Co. No. 3 v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 882 F.2d 1008 (5th
Cir. 1989).
231. Weill v. Kent, 28 So. 295 (La. 1900); Nat’l Bank of Commerce v. Sullivan,
41 So. 480 (La. 1906).
232. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3153 (2014).
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security right.233 And in the case of incorporeal rights—which of
course cannot be reduced to physical possession—the Code requires
that something must be substituted as a symbol to take the place of
actual delivery.234 Thus, generally mere agreement of the parties to
pledge an incorporeal right is not sufficient to effect fictitious
possession to the pledgee;235 rather, some kind of symbol of the right
must be delivered to the creditor.236 For example, “shares of stock in a
corporation may be pledged by delivery of the stock certificate
evidencing the interest in the corporation.”237 For a lender seeking to
obtain a security right in a declaration of CCRs under the law of
pledge, actual possession of the document would be impracticable—
chiefly because the declaration must be recorded in the public records
in order to have effects against third parties and detention of the
declaration would not bestow any particular rights on the possessor.
But, since the rights are incorporeal anyway, actual delivery is
dispensed with under Civil Code article 3153.238 Such being the case,
the declarant should create some kind of document evidencing his or
her rights under the CCRs—such as an agreement for the collateral
assignment and pledge of the rights under the CCRs—which would
then be executed by the parties and retained by the lender.239
233. See id. art. 3152; see also In re Pleasant Hill Lumber Co., 52 So. 1010 (La.
1910). But over time, courts overcame this obstacle in the law of pledge by stating
that as long as the movable was initially transferred to the creditor, the creditor could
then hand the property back to the debtor with the understanding that the debtor was
holding it “in trust” on behalf of the creditor and that the security right remained in
place. See Britton v. Harvey, 16 So. 747 (La. 1895). Evidence of this intent of the
parties was typically accomplished through signing an agreement known as a “trust
receipt.” See RUBIN, supra note 192, at 64.
234. See art. 3153; see also Liberty Farms, Inc. v. Miller, 45 So. 2d 610 (La.
1950).
235. Caffin v. Kirkwan, 7 La. Ann. 221 (La. 1852).
236. Id.
237. Liberty Farms, 45 So. 2d at 615.
238. Art. 3153.
239. See id.; see also Liberty Farms, 45 So. 2d 610. While the need to create a
physical symbol of the incorporeal movable right being pledged, as articulated in
Liberty Farms, has arguably been substantially limited through the 1989 revision to
Louisiana Civil Code article 3158, it is nonetheless advisable to include self-serving
language in the collateral pledge agreement to ensure that the lender and the debtor
are both acknowledging the lender’s quasi-possession of the incorporeal CCR rights
through its possession of the physical document. This confusion arises, in large
part, due to missing Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4321, which was repealed
in 2001 when UCC Article 9 was enacted and which dealt specifically with
pledging incorporeal movable rights that are not evidenced by a written instrument.
See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Consol. Terminal Warehouses, Inc., 460 So. 2d
663, 689 (La. Ct. App. 1984). Unlike promissory notes, bills of exchange, and the
like, which are incorporeal rights evidenced by a writing, CCRs are rights that,
although created through a written instrument, do not confer any rights upon the
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While the use of the term “pledge” is still quite prevalent in
Louisiana commercial transactions, it is merely the result of culture
and custom, rather than any real use of the pledge articles.240 This is
because in the 1990s, the Louisiana Legislature adopted UCC article 9,
which almost completely superseded the articles on pledge.241 Today,
with some narrow exceptions, the sole vehicle whereby one may grant
a security interest in movable property is by following the rules of
UCC article 9, which are laid out in chapter 9 of Title 10 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes.242 Thus, any attempt to grant a security
interest in movable property after January 1, 1990, must comport with
the rules of UCC article 9, as the law of pledge of movables—with few
exceptions—is largely no longer applicable.243
Considering pledge’s lack of contemporary use and utility, one
might wonder how it is implicated in the collateralization of a
declaration of CCRs. Once again, the reason stems from the complex
and multifaceted nature of the instrument itself. As indicated above,
CCRs comprise a myriad of rights that are both considered movable
and immovable.244 And, in some cases, it is difficult to tell whether a
certain right is strictly movable or strictly immovable.245 For instance,
the ability to appoint the members of the board of the association that
governs the development would seem to be a contractual, personal
right.246 However, one might also argue that because this right is
incorporated into the declaration and so closely concerns the ability to
exercise real rights over immovable property—i.e., increasing and
collecting special assessments against the lots or units—that it could
also be classified as a right in an immovable.247
The law of mortgage is one of narrow construction, meaning that
only those certain types of immovable property listed in the Civil Code

holder of that written instrument. Thus, the repeal of Louisiana Revised Statutes
section 9:4321 leaves a hole in the law as to how to perfect a proper pledge of an
incorporeal movable when such a right is not evidenced by a writing.
240. See KILBORN, supra note 192, at 4.
241. RUBIN, supra note 192, at 61.
242. Id. See also LA. REV. STAT. §§ 10:9-101 to -809 (2002).
243. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.1 (2014) (“This Title shall apply to pledges of
movables that are delivered prior to the time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial
Laws becomes effective, including without limitation those pledges that may secure
future obligations and lines of credit, as well as to pledges entered into on or after the
time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes effective that are exempt
or otherwise excluded from coverage thereunder.”).
244. See supra Part II.A–B.
245. See supra Part II.A–B.
246. See supra Part I.A–B and accompanying discussion.
247. See supra Part I.A–B.
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may be encumbered by this type of security device.248 Movable
property is specifically excluded from the law of mortgage.249
However, Louisiana Revised Statutes section 10:9-109(d)(11) states
that “[t]he creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property”
is excluded from coverage under UCC article 9.250 In other words, the
mixed nature of many of the rights in a declaration of CCRs might be
too much like a right in a movable to be covered by the law of
mortgage but too much like a right in an immovable to be covered by
UCC article 9.251 This begs the question of whether some aspects of
the CCRs fall into a sort of gap in Louisiana law whereby they cannot
be encumbered by a consensual security device at all. In these cases, a
shrewd lender’s counsel should adopt a belt and suspenders approach
and attempt to utilize what is left of the law of pledge to ensure any
additional rights are picked up that might be precluded from
collateralization under the laws of mortgage and UCC article 9.
Nevertheless, once a security right has been obtained in the
CCRs—under any one or all of the aforementioned types of security
devices available in Louisiana—the next important issue is
determining what type of liability the lender subjects him or herself to
upon foreclosure of his or her rights in the declaration. To what extent
must the lender, now crowned declarant, pay for the sins and misdeeds
of the original declarant?
III. SUCCESSOR DECLARANTS AND LIABILITY IN LOUISIANA
The question of successor liability for the lender, now turned
declarant, is an issue that continues to vex Louisiana real estate
lawyers. There is no direct statutory authority on point, and Louisiana
courts have not yet created a jurisprudential solution. The source of this
uncertainty likely arises out of the mixed nature of CCR
declarations.252 As is often the criticism by common law
commentators, these association regimes are held together by a
concoction of the law of easements, building restrictions, and land
covenants, as well as special homeowner and condominium association
statutes.253 In Louisiana, each of these various legal principles has
different rules and requirements that either specifically address the
liability of successors or fail to lay out a particular framework for

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(d)(11) (Supp. 2014).
See supra Part II.A–B.
See Natelson, supra note 77, at 50–51.
See Reichman, supra note 90.
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liability altogether.254 As such, lenders and their attorneys are left with
the question of whether to actually become the declarant after
foreclosure because, despite the opportunity to have extensive legal
control over the development, the potential for inherited liability is too
great.255 Understanding the way in which liability passes—or does
not—can be essential in determining what to do with collateral rights
in the declaration upon a default. Choosing not to become the declarant
can mean that the lender forfeits substantial authority and control over
the quality, value, and continued maintenance of the overall
development.
A. Under Assignment and Assumption Principles
Because the question of what regime or set of rules governs the
liability of a lender who dons the mantle of the declarant remains
unanswered, a review of several possibilities is in order. The first of
these is the law of assignment and assumption of obligations, which is
governed by Section 1 of Chapter 4, Title III of Book III of the
Louisiana Civil Code: “Assumption of Obligations.”256 As a general
rule, all obligations are transferable, unless they are strictly personal
and therefore unable to be transferred.257 The Louisiana Civil Code
provides a scheme for making this determination,258 but typically the
rights and duties laid out in any declaration of CCRs will specifically
state that the rights, duties, and obligations contained therein are freely
assignable.259 And, even if such a statement is not so expressly made, it
254. See Uniform Condominium Act (1980), reprinted in UNIFORM REAL
PROPERTY ACTS 7, 7–174 (1991); see also Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
(2008), reprinted in UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY ACTS 345, 345–556 (1991);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4 (2000).
255. See Oceanside Cmty. Ass’n v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983).
256. See LA. CIV. CODE, ch. 4, § 1, Title III of Book III (comprising LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 1821–24 (2014)).
257. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1765 (2014); see also SAUL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS
§ 4.1, in 5 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 55 (2d ed. 2001) (“The Louisiana Civil
Code provides that every obligation is deemed heritable as to all parties, except when
the contrary results from the terms or from the nature of the contract.”).
258. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, §§ 4.11–.15, at 58–66 (describing the various
tests and situations under which an obligation is deemed strictly personal and thus
insusceptible of being assigned or otherwise transferred).
259. Master Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Lockwood
Folly, supra note 129, art. II, § 9 (“The Declarant may assign or pledge any or all of
its rights reserved under the land use documents through an assignment or in an
instrument of conveyance or assignment.” (emphasis added)); Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions of Wyncroft, supra note 129, art. 9
(“Declarant shall have the right and power to assign and delegate to the respective
associations, or any successor or successors thereto, at any time and from time to
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is implied that such is the case because the developer will necessarily
be transferring his or her rights in the declaration when authority and
control is eventually ceded to the elected board of directors of the
association.260
If the lender, through a security device as set forth above, obtains
the rights of the declarant, then he or she has in some sense been
assigned those rights and has correspondingly assumed the
responsibilities and benefits that go with them.261 Although Louisiana
generally considers an assignment to include a transfer of title,262
jurisprudence has also considered the granting of a security right under
the auspices of the law of assignment.263 In terms of the transfer of
debts, Louisiana law recognizes that as long as the “burden is not
increased, rendering performance to one obligee or to another is
relatively immaterial for the obligor, since he must perform
anyway.”264 In this case, the lot or unit owners must perform—for
instance, in the paying of regular assessments—vis-à-vis the declarant
regardless of who occupies that position.265 And by the same token, it
will likely not matter who is performing the declarant’s duties—such
as regular maintenance of the development, ensuring the common
areas are kept aesthetically pleasing, maintaining the facilities so they
function properly etc.—as long as they are being done well and
timely.266 There is an exception, of course, for when the obligee (i.e.,
the homeowner) is relying on some special skill of the obligor (i.e., the
declarant) in performing such duties.267 But because the duties are
typically outsourced to a third party (such as a property management
company) and are, in fact, eventually turned over to the association’s
elected board anyway, it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby an

time, all or any part of any of the rights, powers, and authority contained in this
Declaration.” (emphasis added)). For an example of such a clause in Louisiana, see
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for Segnette Estates, supra
note 129, at article XIII (“Declarant’s Rights. Any or all of the special rights and
obligations of the Declarant set forth in this Declaration or the By-Laws may be
transferred in whole or in part to other Persons . . . .” (emphasis added)).
260. See supra Part I.A–B.
261. See generally TITLE, supra note 109, § 16:1, at 1484–85.
262. See Lusher v. Kilcrease, 384 So. 2d 589 (La. Ct. App. 1980); see also Dorvin
Land Corp. v. Jefferson Parish, 469 So. 2d 1011 (La. Ct. App. 1985); White v.
Gaines, No. 6455, 1877 WL 8158 (La. Nov. 1877).
263. See, e.g., Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Consolidated Terminal Warehouse,
Inc., 460 So. 2d 663 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
264. LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.3, at 226.
265. See id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
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assignment would be prohibited.268 Moreover, because the declaration
typically stipulates that all rights in the document are assignable, there
is little question as to whether the owners’ consents must be
obtained.269
Two categories of assumptions are primarily discussed by
obligations commentators.270 The first occurs when the obligee and a
third party agree that the third party will perform on behalf of the
obligor.271 This scenario is inapplicable to the declarant–lender
relationship described here as far as successor declarants are
concerned. The second and more relevant assumption occurs when an
obligor and a third party agree that the third party will assume the
obligations that the obligor owes to the obligee.272 Under such a
scenario, the obligee’s consent is not necessary (although the obligee
may still give it) to make the agreement effective between the
parties.273 Regardless of whether or not consent is given, both the third
party and the original obligor are liable for the performance to the
obligee.274 So of course, in our developer–declarant situation, the
lender is the third party and the obligor is the declarant who owes
various obligations to the owners under the declaration.275 By taking a
security interest in the declaration, one might characterize the transfer
that occurs when the lender exercises its rights and becomes the
declarant itself as being a sort of transfer and assumption of the
developer’s rights under the declaration.276 However, Louisiana law
does not require that the owners (the obligees to whom performance is
due) consent to the transfer.277 Such being the case, the lender (now the
declarant) and the developer (the original obligor) are both liable to the
owners for whatever obligations are owed under the declaration.278
As is evident from the nature of CCR declarations, the declarant is
both an obligee and an obligor.279 He or she both owes duties to the
owners (regular maintenance and repair of the development and its
facilities and common areas) and is owed duties by them in return (the
timely payment of assessments, adherence to the rules and regulations
268. See id.
269. See supra note 129.
270. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1821, 1823 (2014); see also LITVINOFF, supra note
257, §§ 10.11–.16, 10.21–.26, at 228–39.
271. See art. 1823.
272. See id. art. 1821.
273. LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.12, at 229.
274. Id. §§ 10.13–.14, at 230–31.
275. See supra Part I.A and accompanying discussion.
276. See supra Part II and accompanying discussion.
277. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.11, at 229.
278. See id. §§ 10.13–.14, at 230–31.
279. See supra Part I.A.
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of the development, etc.).280 The same duality of roles is true with
respect to the owners as well.281 Because the declaration is a form of
bilateral or synallagmatic contract, whereby both parties (the declarant
and the owners) may demand performance and owe performance
reciprocally, both the active and the passive aspects of the agreement are
transferred.282 The assignment of such a complex agreement is
recognized under Louisiana law, and by effecting such a transfer, the
third party (the lender in this case) becomes the recipient of the
performance owed by the owner and responsible for the obligations
owed by the declarant.283
Thus, once the assignment is completed and the lender exercises its
rights as the assignee under the declaration, there is a question of
liability. Under the general theories of assumption, the assignee is
responsible for all of the rights and duties of the assignor.284 Whatever
obligations are due by the developer as the original declarant would be
due by the lender as the successor declarant.285 Louisiana
commentators often state that, similar to subrogation (assumption’s
cousin institution), the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor for
all purposes such that it occupies the very place in every respect as the
one that it succeeded.286 The jurisprudence bears this out in practice.287
280. See supra Part I.A–B and accompanying discussion.
281. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908 (2014) (“A contract is bilateral, or
synallagmatic, when the parties obligate themselves reciprocally, so that the
obligation of each party is correlative to the obligation of the other.”).
282. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.34, at 241–42.
283. See id. (“The inter vivos transfer of both the active and the passive side of an
obligation, that is, the assignment of a credit-right on the one hand and the
assumption of the corresponding obligation on the other, may be involved in a
complex transaction such as the assignment of a bilateral or synallagmatic contract.
Each party to such a contract is bound to render to the other a certain performance
and is also obligee of the performance that the other party has bound himself to render
in return, which is succinctly expressed by saying that parties to such contracts are
reciprocally obligors and obligees. The case may be that one of those parties may
agree with a third person to have the performance he owes under the contract
rendered by that person, and may also assign to that person his right to receive the
return performance. When such is the situation, the third person assumes the
obligation of which one of the parties to the contract is obligor, and also becomes
assignee, or transferee, of the credit-right which that party has as obligee.”).
284. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.3, at 226–27.
285. See id.
286. See id. § 11.33, at 260 (“Aside from those differences, the rights acquired by
an assignee and a subrogee are indeed the same. Both acquire, besides the principal
right to demand performance from an obligor, any accessory rights that may
accompany the principal right, including not only suretyship, as recognized by
traditional law, but also the right of preference arising from mortgage, pledge or
privilege. In the case of assignment of a credit-right, the wide range of accessory
rights that may be acquired by the assignee is clearly stated in an article of the
Louisiana Civil Code.”); see also Dardar v. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 556 So. 2d 272 (La. Ct.
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In Hardy v. Whitney,288 the court held that when a third party assumes
the obligation to make repayment of the loan of another, he or she
essentially “assume[s] whatever obligation was owed.”289 Similarly,
the court in McCrory v. Terminix Service Co., Inc. stated that when a
contract is assumed under Civil Code article 1821, the assignee
becomes bound entirely by its terms and “cannot be given relief merely
because they assumed a bad and/or outdated bargain.”290 And the
jurisprudence is replete with cases between assignees of mineral leases
and their assignors arguing over the contractual language in assignment
and assumption clauses as to whether the full force of Civil Code
article 1821 has effected a complete transfer of all rights and
obligations—including those involving remedial obligations for
abandoned wells.291
If the lender–declarant’s successor liability is characterized under
the Louisiana Civil Code’s framework for assignment and assumption
of obligations, then the liability for past bad acts and breaches by the
developer as the declarant would pass automatically to the lender.292
The lender, upon becoming declarant, would step into the shoes of the
developer for all intents and purposes to the extent of the obligations
and duties that are articulated and imposed in the declaration.293
Because the assumption of liability rules are so absolute, there would
be little way for the lender to avoid liability, unless it had specifically,
contractually limited itself in the security agreement with the developer
at the onset. By agreeing to only assume certain rights and duties of the
developer upon taking control as the new declarant, the lender would
therefore be able—under the Civil Code article 1821 jurisprudence—to
cherry-pick and limit its liabilities as successor under the
declaration.294 Under this theory, the lender could essentially insulate
itself from certain liabilities, but this, of course, assumes that the

App. 1990); Dauphin v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d 144 (La. Ct. App. 2002); Horn
v. Lacoste, 793 So. 2d 319 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
287. See Dardar, 556 So. 2d 272; Dauphin, 817 So. 2d 144; Horn, 793 So. 2d
319.
288. 480 So. 2d 766 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
289. Id. at 769.
290. 609 So. 2d 883, 886 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Groom v. W.H. Ward
Lumber Co., 432 So. 2d 984 (La. Ct. App. 1983)); La. Power & Light Co. v. Mecom,
357 So. 2d 596 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
291. See Davis Oil Co. v. TS, Inc., 145 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Pinnacle
Operating Co. v. Ettco Enters., Inc., 914 So. 2d 1144 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Bradford v.
Onshore Pipeline Constr. Co., 853 So. 2d 756 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Union Oil Co. of
Cal. v. Cheyenne Oil Props., Inc., 839 So. 2d 1170 (La. Ct. App. 2003).
292. See LITVINOFF, supra note 257, § 10.3, at 226–27.
293. See generally id.
294. Id.

818

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74

obligations under the declaration are appropriately classified as being
completely contractual in nature. As discussed below, many aspects of
the CCRs are, in fact, closely tied to real rights that are governed by a
wholly different regime.
B. Under Servitudes and Building Restrictions
The question of liability as to successors-in-title to property that is
burdened by a predial servitude or building restriction raises interesting
questions. As a general matter, the obligations that are imposed by
building restrictions, such as those that comprise CCR declarations, run
with the land.295 For some time, there was debate among Louisiana
courts and commentators as to whether these obligations were personal
obligations of the property owners that were consented to when the
property was first purchased or if they were purely the result of real
obligations.296 The Louisiana Supreme Court finally clarified this point
in Brier Lake, Inc. v. Jones, holding that the obligations imposed in
CCR declarations were to be classified solely as real obligations on the
parcels, not personal obligations of the individual owners.297 In this
same vein, referring to both building restrictions and servitudes,
Professor Yiannopoulos further expounded that “the holder of a real
right may abandon it by a unilateral act. Abandonment enables the
holder of a real right to avoid obligations and charges attached to a
thing.”298 Therefore, the liability of one who owes an obligation that
derives from a real right may dispense with his or her duties by merely
transferring the immovable to another.299
Thus, in viewing the issues of successor liability for declarants
through the lens of building restrictions and servitudes, the successor
declarant would seem to take on all the duties and liabilities of its
predecessor.300 Because the obligation is derived purely from its
association with the land—rather than with the individual owner—the
transfer of the property would unavoidably transfer the obligation and
295. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 130, § 195, at 523.
296. See Mariner’s Vill. Master Ass’n, Inc. v. Cont’l Props., 639 So. 2d 1188,
1193 (La. Ct. App. 1994); see also Vill. Square Shopping Ctr. Ass’n v. Nelson, 522
So. 2d 163 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
297. 710 So. 2d 1054, 1063 (La. 1998) (“Jones’ property was, by virtue of the
recordation of the validly enacted Original Restrictions, subject to the Original
Restrictions requiring the affirmative duty of paying assessments, not to exceed
$180.00 per year. We hold that this obligation is properly characterized as a building
restriction and is subject to the two-year prescriptive period of La. C.C. art. 775 and is
not a personal obligation under La. C.C. art. 3499. To the extent that Mariner’s
Village, supra, and Village Square, supra, held otherwise, they are overruled.”).
298. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 214, at 396.
299. See id.
300. See id.
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any past failures to perform the obligation that accompanied it.301
Therefore, it necessarily follows that it would be impossible to separate
the liability for nonperformance of a real obligation from the real
obligation itself.302 To do so would undermine the very idea that the
duties that are attendant upon holders of immovable property subject to a
real obligation are not the personal obligations of the owner.303 If such is
the case, then the lender who assumes the role of declarant necessarily
assumes the obligations of the original declarant who failed to
perform.304 Because the duties, both affirmative and negative—which
are comprised chiefly of building restrictions and servitudes—are real
obligations that are imposed upon the entire development, then any
subsequent transfer of the development would necessarily effect a
transfer of those rights and duties.305 And the developer (as the original
declarant) is able to “avoid obligations and charges attached to” the
property by transferring it to another.306 This result seems harsh but
would be consistent with the general principles governing the transfer of
immovable property subject to a real obligation in Louisiana.
A look to the common law is instructive in this area. Interestingly,
the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Property (Servitudes) provides
some direct guidance as to successors of covenants and servitudes,
which are utilized in a comprehensive common interest community
declaration.307 Section 4.4(1) states that:
An original party or successor to a servitude burden that runs
with an interest in property incurs liability on account of the
servitude burden only for obligations that accrue during the time
the party or successor holds the burdened property interest.308
The comments to the provision explain that the liabilities of a
successor to a servitude are limited to only those that arise during the
time the successor holds the servitude.309 Any obligations that might
have accrued prior to the transfer are not applicable to the successor.310
The example given in the comments illustrates how a transferor is
liable to pay assessments levied against the property pursuant to a

301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4 (2000).
308. Id. § 4.4(1).
309. Id. cmt. b.
310. Id. See also Bd. of Dirs. of Olde Salem Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Sec’y of
Veterans Affairs, 589 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
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neighborhood declaration up to the date of the transfer.311 The
transferee is only liable for assessments after the date of transfer and
not for prior unpaid assessments accruing before the transfer.312 Thus,
the general rules set forth in the Restatement would suggest that the
successor declarant is not liable for the past, unfilled obligations of its
predecessor declarant, such that the lender could exercise its security
rights without fear of being forced to pay for the sins of the developer.
However, the guidance from the Restatement regarding affirmative
obligations, and breaches thereof, with regard to successors is a bit
more complex.313 In general, common law courts have imposed
declaration obligations that are of a continuing nature upon a
successor.314 For instance, if the declaration states that the declarant is
responsible for maintaining the community golf course, a successor
declarant will be held liable for this continued obligation of
maintenance and repair.315 However, Restatement section 4.4(3)
describes a more nuanced, contract-based carve-out to this general rule
for successor liabilities in stating that “[t]he duration of any person’s
liability to perform a servitude burden in gross is determined according
to the rules governing liability to perform contractual obligations.”316
As such, common law courts have further elaborated on this contractbased exception.317 If a developer was bound in the declaration under
contract (rather than in property) to construct certain common facilities
but neglected to do so, he or she would nonetheless continue to be
responsible for fulfilling this obligation even after his or her rights as
declarant had been transferred to another party.318 Thus, if the
declarant failed to construct the community pool as dictated by the
declaration and subsequently transferred his or her rights under the
declaration to another, the successor might be relieved by a court from

311. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4(1) cmt. b (2000).
312. See id. The comments do, however, indicate that “parties to covenants may,
of course, create obligations that will continue to bind the covenantor after transfer of
the property, subject to the limitations imposed by Chapter 3 [] on restraints on
alienation and restraints on trade or competition.” Id.
313. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4(3) (2000).
314. Oceanside Cmty. Ass’n v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1983) (“Generally, after the covenantor transfers the land and his or her
successor becomes liable on the covenant, the covenantor is relieved from further
obligation.”).
315. Id.
316. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4(3) (2000).
317. See Associated Grocers of Iowa Coop., Inc. v. West, 297 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa
1980).
318. See City of Glendale v. Barclay, 385 P.2d 230 (Ariz. 1963); Indian Lake
Maint., Inc. v. Oxford First Corp., 572 So. 2d 536 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990);
Associated Grocers of Iowa Coop., Inc., 297 N.W.2d 103.
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having to construct the pool because of the original contractual
obligation of the developer to complete said construction.319
Under this line of cases, the question of successor liability for
affirmative obligations to construct common areas might be a bit more
uncertain. If the developer–declarant’s obligations could be classified
as purely contractual in nature, then the duty to construct these
common facilities or improvements would remain with him or her,
despite a third party having become the declarant.320 But, if the duty
was recognized as merely a continuing obligation of the declarant
under the declaration, then it would be more akin to an obligation
arising from a covenant and therefore transfer to the successor with the
property itself.321 Still, some states have specifically legislated with
respect to the issue, such as section 1466 of the California Civil Code,
which provides that “[n]o one, merely by reason of having acquired an
estate subject to a covenant running with the land, is liable for a breach
of the covenant before he acquired the estate, or after he has parted
with it or ceased to enjoy its benefits.”322
It is possible that Louisiana courts might similarly distinguish a
duty in a declaration that derives from contract principles from one that
is derived from real obligations in limiting a successor declarant’s
liability. However, such a distinction would likely be born from the
specific facts and circumstances of each case (and the dictates of
equity) rather than from any firm rules.323 Such a shifting, fact-based
framework greatly diminishes the ability of the successor declarant to
accurately weigh and balance its potential liabilities with any certainty
because the characterization of the various rights under the declaration
would be left to the discretion of the courts.

319. See generally GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS §
9.14 (1990).
320. See id.
321. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 4.4, reporter’s note
(2000); see also Oceanside Cmty. Assoc. v. Oceanside Land Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 14
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
322. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1466 (Westlaw 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.116 (for
condominium unit owners), 719.108 (for cooperative unit owners), 721.15 (for timeshare-period owners) (Westlaw 2014).
323. It should be noted that Louisiana courts have historically been hesitant in
utilizing equity when it concerns real rights due to the strictness of the public records
doctrine. See, e.g., Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So. 2d 933 (La. 1984).
Nonetheless, when confronted with a result that would be offensive to notions of
fairness and justice, Louisiana courts have shown a willingness to employ extrastatutory reasoning in order to reach a more balanced or equitable approach. See, e.g.,
Stolier v. Stolier, 357 So. 2d 1334 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Nelson v. Burkeen Const.
Co., 717 So. 2d 261 (La. Ct. App. 1998); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. CBC
Temporary Staffing Servs., Inc., 897 So. 2d 647 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
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C. Under Corporate Law Theories
Another theory under which the question of successor liability for
lenders who become declarants might be resolved stems from theories
of corporate law.324 The general rule of American corporate law is that
when one legal entity sells or otherwise transfers its property to another
legal entity, the assets are transferred free and clear, except for any
valid and preexisting security rights or liens.325 However, exceptions
have been made over time to help blunt the harsh and unfair results that
can come from a strict application of this general principle.326
Sometimes these exceptions came from legislative acts, and other
times they sprang from the equitable powers of the courts.327 Although
generally derived from similar theories that aim to pierce through the
corporate structure when justice so requires, some lawyers and
commentators have argued that the exception theories to successor
liability arise under tort law principles as well.328
Louisiana courts have taken a particularly amorphous view with
regard to successor liability, often rejecting the notion of adopting a
uniform or “ultimate test of successor firm liability.”329 However, they
have generally followed much of the same analysis on certain instances
of successor liability as common law courts.330 The first scenario for
successor liability in Louisiana, and often the easiest to understand,
involves the express or implied assumption of liabilities.331 In this case,
Louisiana courts have looked to whether the facts of the parties,
specifically the successor, evidence an intent to assume the obligations
of the transferor.332 The justification behind this theory is to look to the
business negotiations between the parties and respect their allocation of
transferred responsibilities.333 Under the successor declarant scenario,
it might be difficult to discern whether the borrower and the lender
ever really came to an agreement as to the liability between them
should the lender become the declarant because the anticipation of both
324. See generally George W. Kuney, Successor Liability in Louisiana, 55 LA.
B.J. 172 (2007).
325. See George W. Kuney, A Taxonomy and Evaluation of Successor Liability, 6
FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 11 (2007).
326. Kuney, supra note 324.
327. Id. at 172. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Collapsing Corporate Structures:
Resolving the Tension Between Form and Substance, 60 BUS. LAW 109 (2004).
328. Kuney, supra note 324.
329. Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc., 476 So. 2d 1125 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
330. See Kuney, supra note 324.
331. See id.; see also Michael J. Zaino, Bielagus v. EMRE: New Hampshire
Rejects Traditional Test for Corporate Successor Liability Following an Asset
Purchase, 45 N.H. B.J. 26 (2004).
332. Bourque, 476 So. 2d at 1127.
333. Id.
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parties, at least at the onset, is that there would never be a default and
the loan would be paid in full.334 Nonetheless, perhaps the use of this
theory would suggest that the lender and the borrower could agree in
the collateral security documents that should the lender become the
declarant, all liability for preexisting acts should remain with the
borrower.335 In such a case, this theory of corporate-successor liability
would suggest that the court would respect the agreement between the
parties.336 However, the agreement of the parties as to the allocation of
risks might leave all liabilities with a defunct corporation and thereby
cause great inequity to third-party claimants. As such, Louisiana courts
have been reluctant to fully endorse this theory of successor liability,
preferring to distinguish the facts of each case to provide a course of
redress that is fair to third parties.337
Fraud is at the core of Louisiana’s second theory of successor
liability.338 This theory is typically seen in the creditor-fraud scenario
whereby a debtor–corporation transfers certain valuable assets—which
would otherwise be the common pledge of its creditors—to a separate
but affiliated corporation.339 By doing so, the debtor–corporation hopes
to remove the assets from possible seizure by its creditors.340 The
Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Wolff v. Shreveport Gas that it
would attach the ancestor’s liability to the successor when a transfer of
assets was made to perpetuate fraud.341 But, the creditor-fraud theory is
less applicable to the lender turned declarant scenario. The borrower–
developer is not attempting to transfer its powers under the declaration
to escape its responsibilities to the association members.342 Rather,
power is being unwillingly wrenched from it by its creditor because of
its failure to pay the loan.343 Because the transfer is involuntary on the
part of the transferor, it is doubtful that this fraud-based theory would

334. See generally id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. See Kuney, supra note 324, at 173; see also TLC Novelty Co., Inc. v.
Perino’s Inc., 881 So. 2d 1267 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Morrison v. C.A. Guidry
Produce, 856 So. 2d 1222 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Central Bus. Forms Inc. v. N-Sure
Sys. Inc. 540 So. 2d 1029 (La. Ct. App. 1989).
338. See Kuney, supra note 324, at 173; see also Milliken & Co. v. Duro Textiles,
LLC, 19 Mass. L. Rptr. 509 (Mass. 2005) (discussing the causation requirements
involved in this theory).
339. Kuney, supra note 324, at 173.
340. Id.
341. 70 So. 789 (La. 1916).
342. See supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion.
343. See supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion.
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play a part in imposing liability under the declaration upon the
lender.344
The last theory under which Louisiana courts have imposed
successor liability in abrogation of the general rule against it involves
de facto mergers.345 The main aspects of this theory were also
annunciated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wolff v. Shreveport
Gas.346 This theory can arise in any of four scenarios.347 The first
involves multiple corporations ceasing to exist, with only one new
entity left at the end.348 The second involves a situation whereby “one
of the corporate parties ceases to exist while the other continues.”349
The third involves a new corporation that, although not formally, is, in
reality, “the reincarnation of the old one.”350 And lastly, the fourth
involves a shell corporation that, although it continues to exist, has in
fact merged with another entity that has acquired all of its assets and
business.351 In each of these scenarios, it is difficult to see how a
lender–declarant would be imposed with liability, unless the borrower
and the lender were affiliate companies or the borrower was a wholly
owned subsidiary of the lender.352 If such were the case, then the
doctrine of continuation of corporate existence that was articulated in
Wolff and its progeny would seem to apply.353
In reviewing all of the possible theories under which Louisiana
courts impose successor liability, it seems likely that the declarant–
lender could only fall into the first category.354 In such a case, it would
be incumbent upon the lender to ensure that it does not contract with
the borrower so as to suggest that it will assume past obligations and
liabilities under the declaration.355 Nevertheless, it should be
remembered that the doctrine of successor liability in corporate law is
an equitable one, meant to provide fairness to the parties when justice
demands that liability transfer to a successor.356 It is not difficult to
344. See supra Part I.C and accompanying discussion regarding the specific facts
and circumstances surrounding CCRs and the fact scenarios under which Louisiana’s
various successor liabilities arise.
345. See generally G. William Joyner III, Beyond Budd Tire; Examining
Successor Liability in North Carolina, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 889, 894 (1995).
346. 70 So. at 794.
347. Kuney, supra note 324, at 174.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. See id.; see also Nat’l Sur. Corp. v. Pope Park, Inc., 121 So. 2d 240, 243 (La.
1960); Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F.2d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1992).
354. Kuney, supra note 324, at 173.
355. Id.
356. See MORRIS & HOLMES, supra note 202, § 37.02, at 279.
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imagine that a court, when faced with claims by association members
for unfulfilled obligations of the declarant, might turn away from the
broke and financially distressed developer and to the resource-rich and
capable lender to provide relief.357 As with all doctrines that are born
out of equity, the lack of clear rules and guidelines makes predictability
difficult.358
IV. FAIRNESS AND FLEXIBILITY: CRITIQUES AND A PROPOSED
SOLUTION
Louisiana law presents a variety of possible theories, but no
definitive answers, as to the issue of successor liability for lenders
turned declarants.359 Louisiana law provides a relatively small menu of
options for courts to use in dealing with these complicated lender–
borrower–third-party-owner transactions.360 In trying to balance the
rights of the parties and provide the most fair and market-efficient
solution, courts have very few doctrines with which to wield and none
are squarely on point.361
A. A Critique of State Doctrinal Possibilities
While all or any one of the concepts and doctrines offered above
could arguably be used to fill the gaps in determining liability for
lenders turned declarants, they all come with their own unique set of
limitations and complications.362 First, because it is the granting of a
security interest in the declaration that allows the lender to become the
declarant, it arguably makes sense to use assignment and assumption
concepts to determine the liability of a successor declarant.363
However, this analysis presents its own set of problems because an
absolute application of the rules of assignment and assumption could
variously create too great a burden on the lender in being subject to the

357. See generally id.
358. Id.; see also Kuney, supra note 324, at 173 (“When examining successor
liability, especially when crossing from one jurisdiction to another, one should keep
in mind that there is variance and overlap between the species and their formulation
in particular jurisdictions. The label a court uses for its test is not necessarily one with
a standardized meaning applicable across jurisdictions. Accordingly, it is dangerous
to place too much reliance on a name; the underlying substance should always be
examined.”).
359. See supra Part III.A–C and accompanying discussion.
360. See supra Part III.A–C.
361. See supra Part III.A–C.
362. See supra Part III.A–C.
363. See supra Part III.A.
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past misdeeds of the borrower or too little accountability on the new
declarant vis-à-vis the unit or lot owners.364
Alternatively, because servitudes and building restrictions are so
intimately bound up in the common interest community concept—
whether used in an apartment building, a commercial office/retail
development, or a residential subdivision—it seems persuasive to
analyze successor liability under Louisiana’s property-oriented
principles.365 However, these frameworks are fairly broad and would
seem to absolutely transfer the real obligations (including obligations
arising from nonperformance) to the successor owner, without regard
to the culpability of the prior owner.366 And while the Restatement of
Property (Servitudes) provides a more nuanced approach that
contemplates the timing and nature of real obligations arising from the
owner of land vis-à-vis owners in a chain of title, this approach has not
been adopted in Louisiana.367 Further, the Restatement’s contract
versus real rights distinction is inconsistent and lacks the level of
clarity that would be needed to truly create a reliable resolution to the
issue of successor declarant liability.368
Lastly, corporate law’s varied scheme for successor liability
provides a fairly nuanced construction that could serve as a guidepost
in helping to determine the question of successor liability.369 However,
the jurisprudence that directs and informs corporate successor liability
is distinctly different from the facts and circumstances of most lender
collateral take-over scenarios. In addressing the issue of lender liability
for declarants, Louisiana will likely employ various portions of the
laws of assignment, assumption, servitudes, building restrictions, and
corporate successor liability to craft a fair and suitable remedy.370 The
question that arises, however, is to what extent any of these theories,
even when combined or amalgamated with one another, can provide
the necessary tools to craft a remedy that comports with the need to
limit liability in order for the real estate financing market to operate
efficiently but also provides the protections deserved by the unit or lot
owners when a prior declarant has caused them to suffer a loss.371

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
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B. The Community Regime Approach
Despite their individual deficiencies, the theories offered above372
share one common flaw: none are meant to deal with the very detailed,
sophisticated, and complex nature of common-interest developments.373
The beauty—as well as the complexity—of these developments, which
comprise such an assortment of parties, uses, purposes, and functions, is
that they are only made possible by a combination of elements from all
of these assorted legal regimes.374 The transferability and assignment of
rights help provide a structure to facilitate the necessary financing that
makes the construction and operation of the project possible.375
Principles of real charges on property in the form of servitudes and
building restrictions provide mechanisms to enforce standards of quality
and infuse the declaration with functionality and authority.376 And
finally, the interposition of corporate and business entity constructs
make continuing governance and order possible for the duration of the
development’s life.377
However, the issue of successor liability for declarants is a very
specific and idiosyncratic problem that is particular to these types of
developments where the parties bind themselves to a government-style
private structure of rights and duties to acquire, maintain, and develop
their common-ownership interests in the property.378 The complex
arrangement of these parties—the owners, the developer, and the
lender—does not neatly fit into any of the above legal regimes. In
order to address such a nuanced issue born out of such a complex and
multifaceted legal framework, only a comprehensive legislative
enactment that is specifically geared toward these types of
developments can effectively address the issue.379
1. Deficiencies in Current Statutory Frameworks
Louisiana has adopted a comprehensive framework for at least two
different types of common interest communities.380 The first is the
Louisiana Condominium Act (LCA), which was first enacted as the
Horizontal Property Act of 1962 but was amended, renamed, and
372. See supra Part III.A–C.
373. See supra Part III.A–C.
374. See supra Part III.A–C; see also supra Part I.A–C and accompanying
discussion.
375. See supra Part III.A.
376. See supra Part III.B.
377. See supra Part III.C.
378. See supra Part I.A–C and accompanying discussion.
379. See generally supra Part I.A–C.
380. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 144, at 334–35.
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reenacted in both 1974 and again in 1979.381 While the general rules of
ownership in the Louisiana Civil Code do not recognize or allow such
a system of ownership of vertical units and co-ownership of common
elements in the way that condominiums are contemporarily thought of,
the LCA provides a special legal regime that supplements the
Louisiana Civil Code and allows for such a structure.382
The other common interest community system that has been
specifically codified in Louisiana is the Louisiana Homeowners
Association Act (LHOA).383 Much like the LCA, the LHOA allows for
the establishment of a single, comprehensive legal regime that is given
the power—through a combination of corporate law, building
restrictions, and servitudes—to provide and maintain uniform and
quality standards for the grounds, buildings, and improvements within
a residential subdivision.384 Both statutes allow for, among other
things, the creation of an association to govern the community, the
ability to dictate aesthetic and other property standards to maintain the
quality of the development, and the power to impose fees that
constitute liens against the property that support the costs and expenses
of maintenance and repair.385
However, despite their many useful qualities, neither the LCA nor
the LHOA address the duties and responsibilities of lenders who step
into the shoes of the declarant vis-à-vis the unit or lot owners within
the common interest community.386 The LHOA defines a declaration
as “any instrument, however denominated, that establishes or regulates,
or both, a residential planned community, and any amendment thereto”
but does not elaborate any further as to its effects or the transfer or the
rights under it.387 Similarly, the LCA actually mentions the declarant
and imposes on the declarant a duty to collect two months’ worth of
assessments at the time of the initial sale of the units in order to build
up an association reserve but goes no further to address the potential
381. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1121.101 (2008).
382. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 90, § 144, at 334–35. (“Like its predecessor, the
Condominium Act of 1979 is a statute of limited scope, ancillary to the Civil Code.
As a specialized extension of the Civil Code, the statute ought to be interpreted
against the background of the Louisiana civilian tradition and in harmony with it.
Matters not directly determined by the act will be resolved by application of the
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. It ought to be kept in mind that the act does not
authorize horizontal division of all immovables, but merely of immovable property
subjected to a condominium regime by the appropriate declaration.”). See also Tyler
J. Douglas, Unreasonable Results from the Lack of Reasonableness Standard in the
Louisiana Condominium Act, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L 209 (2010).
383. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1141.1–.9 (2008).
384. Id.
385. See id.
386. Id. §§ 9:1121.101, :1141.1–.9.
387. Id. § 9:1141.2.
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liabilities once he or she is no longer the declarant.388 In essence,
Louisiana’s only two statutes that are directly related to the creation
and governance of common interest communities are completely
devoid of any guidance as to what rights and duties a successor inherits
when he or she dons the mantle of the declarant.389 Although Louisiana
has not ventured down the path of creating a single, comprehensive
common interest community statute that addresses, among other
things, successor liability for declarants, various model and uniform
acts dealing specifically with such developments offer several viable
options.
2. The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act
Model and uniform acts often serve as guideposts to Louisiana
courts in looking to fill gaps in the law.390 In many instances, the
Louisiana Legislature has adopted—either wholesale or merely in
part—various model or uniform acts as part of an ongoing effort to
modernize and improve state law in a given area.391 The Model
Business Corporation Act,392 the Model Execution of Wills Act,393
various articles from the Uniform Commercial Code,394 and the Model
Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse Neglect395 are
just a few of the uniform acts that have been used in furthering efforts
to provide more efficiency in the law and to harmonize Louisiana law
with the law of other states.396
And while model and uniform acts can and are promulgated by a
variety of groups across the country and around the globe, a
388. Id. § 9:1121.101.
389. Id.; id. § 9:1141.1–.9.
390. See Christopher K. Odinet, The Anchor Effect—Contemporary Legal Reform,
the Civil Law Tradition, and Changing Expectations, 88 TUL. L. REV. (forthcoming
Spring 2014).
391. See id.
392. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:286 (2008). The editor’s comment notes:
“This section is derived from the more extensive provisions on indemnification
contained in the 1983 Revised Model Business Corporation Act.” Id.
393. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2401, editor’s note (2005) (“This section was
based upon the ‘Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, of 1910’ which was declared
obsolete when its provisions were incorporated in and covered by § 7 of the ‘Model
Execution of Wills Act, of 1940.’ The latter act has not been adopted by the
legislature, but its improved language was tracked in this Section.”).
394. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to -109, :3-101 to -807, :4-101 to -504,
:4a-101 to -507, :5-101 to -118, :7-101 to -701, :8-101 to -511 (2003); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9-101 to -809 (2002).
395. See LA. CHILD. CODE art. 679 cmt. b (2014) (“These changes are consistent
with the A.B.A. Model Act Governing the Representation of Children in Abuse
Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings adopted in August, 2011.”).
396. See generally Odinet, supra note 390.
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particularly influential organization that has made a substantial impact
in the ongoing effort to harmonize the various laws in the United States
is the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(ULC).397 Among the areas of the law given treatment by the ULC
include efforts to deal with real estate collective or associated type
communities.398 Its first efforts resulted in the Uniform Condominium
Act of 1977, the Uniform Planned Community Act of 1980, and the
Model Real Estate Cooperative Act of 1981.399 But there was a general
desire to combine these various related and similar legal regimes into
one model act.400 This desire resulted in the 1982 promulgation of the
Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA).401 The UCIOA
was meant to supplant and take the place of the three prior acts by
creating a comprehensive framework for all common-interest
ownership regimes, which would be able to contemplate the legal
needs and desires of those building, working, and living in
condominiums, cooperative developments, and other types of planned
communities.402
In order to fulfill these omnibus goals, the UCIOA was drafted to
be both wide-ranging and all-inclusive such that it covers everything
from the creation of the common interest real estate community, to the
management and proper administration of the development, all the way
to the termination, in whole or in part, of the entire regime.403 And—
because real estate transactions have taken on a greater complexity
over time—the UCIOA also provides a prophylactic framework of
disclosures, warranties, buyer’s rights, and other consumer
protections.404

397. See generally Henry D. Gabriel, The Revisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code—Process and Politics, 19 J.L. & COM. 125, 126 (1999).
398. See generally Robert Kratovil, The Declaration of Restrictions, Easements,
Liens, and Covenants: An Overview of an Important Document, 22 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 69, 79–80 (1988).
399. See Common Interest Ownership Act Summary, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
NAT’L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. L., http://uniformlaws.org/Act
Summary.aspx?title=Common%20Interest%20Ownership%20Act (last visited Nov.
7, 2013) [http://perma.cc/EB5Q-KL7K] (archived Mar. 10, 2014).
400. See generally id.
401. Id.
402. Id. See also Gordon H. Buck, Beware the Inadvertent Condominium the
Commercial Common Interest Community—Choices under the Uniform Condominium
Act, 22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 65 (1987).
403. See Common Interest Ownership Act Summary, supra note 399.
404. Id.
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a. Liability for Original Declarants Under the UCIOA
Interestingly, the UCIOA provides very specific guidance as to
successor liability for declarants.405 In fact, not only does the UCIOA
contain provisions that are specifically on point, it contains a rather
intricate framework that attempts to balance the rights of the innocent
successor declarant and the rights of the injured lot or unit owners who
have suffered a loss.406 Specifically, section 3–104 of the UCIOA
provides for the effects of the transfer of declarant rights.407 The
section states that when a declarant has transferred rights under the
declaration, the declarant’s liability is as follows:
(1) A transferor is not relieved of any obligation or liability
arising before the transfer and remains liable for warranty
obligations imposed upon him by this [act]. Lack of privity
does not deprive any unit owner of standing to maintain an
action to enforce any obligation of the transferor.
(2) If a successor to any special declarant right is an affiliate of
a declarant[], the transferor is jointly and severally liable with
the successor for any obligations or liabilities of the successor
relating to the common interest community.
(3) If a transferor retains any special declarant rights, but
transfers other special declarant rights to a successor who is not
an affiliate of the declarant, the transferor is liable for any
obligations or liabilities imposed on a declarant by this [act] or
by the declaration relating to the retained special declarant
rights and arising after the transfer.
(4) A transferor has no liability for any act or omission or any
breach of a contractual or warranty obligation arising from the
exercise of a special declarant right by a successor declarant
who is not an affiliate of the transferor.408
Thus, under this regime, the developer, as the original declarant, is
not off the hook for his or her own bad acts or failure to fulfill
obligations.409 Specifically, the UCIOA provides that liability remains
with the developer for those obligations and duties that arose under his
or her reign as declarant and continue even when the declarant powers
have been placed into the hands of another.410
405.
(2008).
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.

See Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION
Id. § 3–104.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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b. Liability for Successor Declarants Under the UCIOA
However, section 3–104 further stipulates, in pertinent part,
explicitly what liabilities a successor declarant, such as a lender who
forecloses on its security rights in the declaration, incurs.411 Generally,
all successor declarants are subject to the obligations and liabilities
imposed by the UCIOA or the declaration, but, importantly, they are
not subject to liabilities that might arise out of
(A) Misrepresentations by any previous declarant;
(B) Warranty obligations on improvements made by any
previous declarant, or made before the common interest
community was created;
(C) Breach of any fiduciary obligation by any previous
declarant or his appointees to the executive board; or
(D) Any liability or obligation imposed on the transferor as a
result of the transferor’s acts or omissions after the
transfer.412
Here, the UCIOA’s framework contemplates the exact scenario
involving Realty Bank, Developer A, and Bluebell Lane discussed in
the introduction above as to what position a lender is placed when it
dons the mantle of the declarant.413 The risk and uncertainty that
faces the lender in determining whether to foreclose on the
declaration is made explicit and certain by the dictates of the
statute.414
411. Id.
412. Id. See also id. cmt. 1 (“This section deals with the issue of the extent to
which obligations and liabilities imposed upon a declarant by this Act are transferred
to a third party by a transfer of the declarant’s interest in a common interest
community. There are two parts to the problem. First, what obligations and liabilities
to unit owners (both existing and future) should a declarant retain, notwithstanding
his transfer of interests. Second, what obligations and liabilities may fairly be
imposed upon the declarant’s successor in interest.”).
413. Id. cmt. 7 (“The section handles the problem of certain successor declarants
(i.e., persons whose sole interest in the project is the protection of debt security) in
three ways. First, subsection (c) provides that, in the case of a foreclosure of a
security interest or a sale by a trustee in bankruptcy of any units owned by a
declarant, any person acquiring title to all of the units being foreclosed or sold may
request the transfer of special declarant rights. In that event, and only upon such
request, such rights will be transferred in the instrument conveying title to the units
and such transferee will thereafter become a successor declarant subject to the other
provisions of this section. In the event of a foreclosure, sale by a trustee under a deed
of trust, or sale by a trustee in bankruptcy of all units owned by a declarant, if the
transferee of such units does not request the transfer of special declarant rights then,
under subsection (d), those special declarant rights cease to exist and any period of
declarant control terminates.”).
414. Id. § 3–104.
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In attempting to protect the interests of the unit or lot owners, the
lender must take on all duties and responsibilities that are imposed
upon the declarant under the law and the declaration.415 However, the
lender is not subjected to those responsibilities that arise from any
fraud that was perpetuated by the developer such as misrepresentations
regarding the quality of certain improvements and amenities in the
development.416 Nor is the lender responsible for special obligations of
warranty or the breach of the developer’s fiduciary duties when it was
in control of the association—such as the misappropriation of
association funds or malfeasance in management of the
development.417
And lastly, the UCIOA provides a special rule for lenders who both
purchase the property at foreclosure sale and take on the mantle of the
declarant but only intend to hold these rights for an interim time period
until a willing buyer can be identified.418 During this interim holding
period, the lender is strictly and narrowly limited in its ability to
exercise rights under the declaration, but, in return for this limitation, is
exempted from any and all liability under the declaration except for its
own bad acts.419 This last provision “permits a foreclosing lender to
undertake such a transaction without incurring the full burden of
declarant obligations and liabilities.”420 Of course, these lenderfriendly rights are balanced against the “need for continuing operation
of the association and, to that end, permit[] a foreclosing lender to
assume control of the association for the purpose of ensuring a smooth
transition” to a subsequent buyer.421
As the editor’s comments to section 3–103 so clearly set forth, the
UCIOA strives to balance “what obligations and liabilities to unit
owners (both existing and future) a declarant should retain” with “what
obligations and liabilities may fairly be imposed upon the
declarant’s successor in interest.”422 In doing so, the UCIOA addresses
the important question of what happens to a lender who takes a
security interest in a declaration to protect its collateral but faces the
risk of being subjected to open-ended liability.423 In answering this
question, the UCIOA subjects the original declarant to “continuing
obligations and liabilities for promises, acts, or omissions undertaken
during the period that he was in control of the community,” while at
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Id. cmt. 7.
See id. § 3–104.
Id. cmt. 1.
Id. § 3–104.
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the same time releasing that same original declarant from
“responsibilities with respect to the promises, acts, or omissions of a
successor over whom he has no control.”424 The new successor incurs
obligations to the unit or lot owners for which it can accurately assess
and plan for and be relieved of the phantom of liability for unknown
liabilities arising from the acts of its predecessor.425
3. A Call for Reform
In addressing the issue of successor liability for declarants,
Louisiana has no direct statutory or jurisprudential authority from
which to draw a definitive conclusion.426 Also, of the several sources
of state law that can be drawn from, none provide Louisiana courts
with the precise tools that they need to craft an inclusive jurisprudential
remedy.427 Each legal regime described above, in combination with the
others, plays an integral part in the common-interest ownership regime,
but none can be joined in such a way as to address the issue of what to
do with the rights and duties of third parties who step into the shoes of
the declarant.428
The issue of successor liability for declarants in common interest
communities is not an easy one.429 It involves the intersection of very
important but very opposed interests.430 On the one hand, the unit or lot
owners must be protected from the malfeasance or breach of the
declarant’s responsibilities by having a party against which they can
seek recourse.431 Further, to ensure that the new declarant (the lender)
has sufficient buy-in and commitment to the development, a certain
level of liability and responsibility must be imposed upon the declarant
to give him or her some skin in the game.432 All the while, however,
any resolution of the issue must ensure that reliable and risk-assessable
security rights are available to parties that lend the money and make
the investments that cause the many successful common interest
communities across the country to be possible.433
What Louisiana needs is a comprehensive framework that can
address all of the specific and complex scenarios that often arise in
common interest communities, and the UCIOA provides many key
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

Id. cmt. 2.
Id. § 3–104.
See supra Part III.A–C.
See supra Part III.A–C.
See supra Part III.A–C.
See supra Part III.A–C.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part I.
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provisions that can be used in crafting such a statute.434 The UCIOA
ensures that the original declarant is not relieved of liability for the
original promises that he or she had made and the obligations that he or
she had undertaken, while at the same time imposes upon the lender
enough responsibility that it will feel that it has sufficient legal
responsibilities to warrant careful and prudent administration of the
development.435 And lastly, to effectuate an efficient transition of the
property into the hands of a more permanent owner, the UCIOA allows
the successor declarant to surrender some of its rights under the
declaration for an interim period in exchange for a waiver of most
liabilities.436 The enactment of all or most of these concepts into either
the LCA, the LHOA, or some combined, comprehensive commoninterest statutory framework would provide just the kind of definitive
set of rules and standards that would provide fairness both to the unit
or lot owners and the successor declarant, while at the same time
creating a level of stability and reliability in the Louisiana real estate
lending market.437
CONCLUSION
As American real estate and land-use planning continues to
gravitate toward common interest communities and highly planned
developments, the use of CCR declarations to achieve these policy
goals is all too inevitable.438 Furthermore, on the heels of the Great
Recession and the economic woes that accompanied the housing
industry’s crash in 2007 and 2008, lenders are more cautious than ever
in their support of speculative real estate projects.439 This lender
hesitation highlights, more so now than ever, the importance of a
434. See supra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying discussion.
435. See supra Part IV.B.2.
436. See supra Part IV.B.2.
437. See supra Part IV.B.2.
438. See supra Introduction and Part I and accompanying discussion.
439. See Brena Swanson, Freddie Mac: Mortgage Rates Unwind After Making
Progress, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov. 27, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.housingwire.com
/articles/28141-freddie-mac-mortgage-rates-unwind-last-weeks-progress [http://perma
.cc/5B8F-A8K6] (archived Mar. 10, 2014); Brian Collins, Mortgage Companies Face
Tough First Quarter, Industry Expert Says, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Nov. 27, 2013,
12:46 PM), http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/dailybriefing/mortgage-companiesface-tough-first-quarter-industry-expert-says-1040074-1.html?site=default_msn [http:
//perma.cc/A9P8-EKRV] (archived Mar. 10, 2014); Jann Swanson, Short Sales
Becoming Less Favorable for Lenders, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (Nov. 25, 2013, 6:27
PM), http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/11252013_realtytrac_home_sales.asp [http:
//perma.cc/R8V9-N4SW] (archived Mar. 10, 2014); Les Christie, Mortgage Rates Fall
amid Weak Economic Data, CNN MONEY (Nov. 21, 2013, 11:37 AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/21/real_estate/mortgage-rates/ [http://perma.cc/4V3Y-3
BVE] (archived Mar. 10, 2014).
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developer being able to provide strong and dependable collateral to
entice the lender to advance funds.440 The declaration of CCRs
represents an important piece of such a collateral package because of
the many advantages that it bestows on the holder.441 The declarant is
able to enforce the collection of common assessments that support the
maintenance of the development and has considerable decision-making
authority as to the direction and goals of the common interest
community.442
But in Louisiana, the decision to take a security interest in such
collateral is not one that can be easily made by a lender.443 The
difficulty in making this determination lies in the open question of
exactly how such incorporeal rights can be effectively collateralized, as
well as what types of liability the lender will incur as the successor to
the developer when it becomes the declarant.444 As to the first question,
Louisiana’s law of security devices seems to require a piecemeal and
multidimensional approach to taking a security interest in CCRs.445
Many of the most important and widely used security devices are
implicated in ultimately confecting such collateral in favor of the
lender.446 Because the declaration comprises rights that are movable
and immovable in nature (as well as some rights that are arguably
mixed), a lender will need to take a mortgage in the various servitudes
and building restrictions on the land and improvements, as well as a
UCC article 9 interest in the general intangible movable aspects of the
declaration. And finally, as a prophylactic measure, the lender should
obtain a pledge of the “gap” or “in between” aspects of the CCRs.447
With regard to the lender’s liability as the successor under the
declaration, the resolution to this issue is even more uncertain.448 The
laws of many other states provide a body of case law and various
statutory sources from which this issue can be analyzed.449 However,
Louisiana lacks such direct, on-point resources for this particular type of
CCR-related lender liability. One possibility is for the question to be
analyzed under the framework of the law of assignments and assumption
because, essentially, the collateralization of the CCRs represents a
transfer of the rights of the developer as the declarant to a third party (the

440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

See supra Introduction and Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II–IV.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.B.
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lender) to secure repayment of the debt.450 On the other hand, one could
equally argue that because so many of the most salient features of a
declaration of CCRs comprise building restrictions and limited personal
servitudes, the issue of successor liability should be governed by that
particular legal regime.451 And lastly, because the control of the
association—which governs the common interest community itself—is
the chief power being conferred by the declaration on the developer, and
thereby being foreclosed and taken over by the lender, one might assert
that the established doctrine of successor liability under the corporate
law system should be dispositive.452
In the end, each of these lenses through which the issue of the
successor liability of lenders turned declarants can be viewed provide a
weak and unclear result.453 The reason for these inadequacies stems
from the fact that each of these different types of legal regimes are
distinctly part of the makeup of a common interest community, but it is
their interplay and ability to connect with each other that gives effect to
the CCR framework itself and thereby makes the community viable.454
The way in which the building restrictions and servitudes provide an
enforcement mechanism for the association, which is funded, in turn,
by the statutory authority to charge assessments against the lots or
units, all come together to form the very core of what makes a common
interest community possible.455 No single aspect operates alone to give
life to the whole.456
Therefore, because of the complex and labyrinthine set of rules and
legal institutions that underlie CCR declarations, it is only logical that
an equally nuanced and comprehensive statutory construct would be
needed to address the intricate issues of successor liability for lenders
turned declarants.457 One such legal construct is the Uniform Common
Interest Ownership Act, which provides an omnibus statutory
framework for all common interest communities—whether residential,
condominium, commercial, or mixed-use—and provides a fair and
balanced system for the allocation of risks and liabilities between the
declarant and successors.458 And while it may not be necessary to
adopt the UCIOA in full, an incorporation of its more useful and wide450. See supra Part III.A.
451. See supra Part III.B.
452. See supra Part III.C.
453. See supra Part IV.A.
454. See supra Part IV.
455. See supra Part II.A.
456. See supra Part IV.A and accompanying discussion of the interplay between
the various property, contract, and corporate law institutions in forming the
declaration.
457. See supra Part IV.B.2.
458. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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ranging provisions into Louisiana law would go far in creating a legal
approach to dealing with both the collateralization and the lender
liability issues related to CCR declarations.459
As Louisiana has managed to weather the storms of the housing
crisis better than many of its sister states, lawmakers must be mindful
that in order to maintain an active and thriving real estate market, the
laws governing such transactions must be clear and even-handed.460 In
doing so, Louisiana should adopt a comprehensive approach to the issue
described here, which takes into account the rights of the aggrieved lot
or unit owners such that they would be afforded an avenue of recourse
for their losses or damages, while at the same time apportioning
liabilities between the lender and the borrower in a way that provides
fairness, foreseeability, and the capacity to reasonably assess the risks
of CCR foreclosure.461

459. See supra Part IV.B.3.
460. See Kate Morgan, The Nation’s Foreclosure Crisis Seems to Have Skipped
Louisiana, NOLA (Dec. 27, 2008, 10:09 PM), http://blog.nola.com/tpmoney/2008/12
/the_nations_foreclosure_crisis.html [http://perma.cc/UXB9-GZVL] (archived Mar. 10,
2014); State of The South: Jobs Rise but What About Real Estate?, INVESTORS BUS.
DAILY (Nov. 14, 2013, 6:15 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com /news/state-south-jobs-risereal-231500864.html [http://perma.cc/8NHC-24NB] (archived Mar. 10, 2014);
Louisiana Housing Market Strong Despite National Trends, PRWEB (June 13, 2013),
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2008/06/prweb104 2744.htm [http://perma.cc/SWW5FYM2] (archived Mar. 10, 2014).
461. See supra Part IV and accompanying discussion.

